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ABSTRACT

American foundations and other philanthropic giving entities hold
about $1 trillion in investment assets, and thatfigure continues to grow
every year. Even as urgent contemporary needs go unmet, philanthropic
organizationsspend only a tiny fraction of their wealth each year, mostly
due to restrictive terms in contracts between donors and firms limiting the
rate at which donations can be distributed.Law has played a critical role
in underwriting and encouraging this buildup of philanthropicwealth. For
instance, contributors can typically take a full tax deduction for the value
of their contributions today, no matter when the foundation spends their
money, and pay no tax on the investment earnings the organization reaps
in the meantime.
What, if anything, justifies public supportfor "restricted spending"
charity? This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of that
question and supplies original empirical evidence on several key aspects
of it. I argue that restrictedspending sacrifices crucial information, leaves
superior opportunities on the table, and on average transfers funds to
times when they are less useful. While there is a place for large and long-
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lived philanthropic organizations in American society, that role does not
require public supportfor restrictedspending. As long as foundations can
demonstrate their value to new donors, they will continue to thrive. I set
out a series of policy recommendations aimed at better reconciling
nonprofit law and the principles thatjustify it.
I support my claims with new evidence drawn from a data set of over
200, 000 firm-year observations of privatefoundations. For example, Ifind
that foundations earn about twice as much money per year as in earlier
studies funded by foundation-industry lobbyists and that they are growing
three times faster than those earlierstudies suggested. This finding implies
that the law could require a much higher annual "payout" from
foundations. I also find that new laws introduced in about a dozen states
since 2006 have significantly slowed foundation spending in the enacting
states. Last, I offer simulations of several policy proposals for making
foundations more effective atfighting recessions.
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INTRODUCTION

If the US philanthropic sector were the output of a nation, it would rank
as the product of the world's sixteenth-largest economy, just behind
Mexico, and ahead of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden.1 Philanthropic
institutions on this scale are uniquely American. 2 Other wealthy nations,
such as Great Britain and Germany, have recently begun to develop
modest philanthropic sectors, but nothing to rival ours.3 Some of this
phenomenon is cultural, an outgrowth of the ideals of the decentralized
American state. 4 Much of it, though, likely owes its success to legal rules
that have encouraged the accumulation of philanthropic wealth, including
a set of generous federal and state tax subsidies.5 In a modern era where
wealth and power are growing ever more concentrated, what justifies this
use of public funds to underwrite private, if charitable, wealth?
The growth of philanthropic wealth depends on law's willingness to
embrace what I will call a policy of restricted spending. At many
charitable organizations, managers are free to spend most or all of the
firm's revenues on current needs, whether they be housing the indigent or
curing deadly diseases. Foundations, in contrast, almost uniformly are
governed by agreements that prohibit managers from spending more than

1. See GDP Ranking, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-rankingtable (last updated Apr. 11, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc78YB-ZSZ4. If we only compared
changes in US philanthropic wealth to world GDPs, US philanthropy would rank around sixtieth,
behind New Zealand but ahead of Hungary. Id.
2. Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Philanthropic Foundations: An International
Perspective, in PRIVATE FUNDS, PUBLIC PURPOSE: PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 3, 8 (Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler eds., 1999).
3. Id. at 3-5.

4.

DAVID C. HAMMACK & HELMUT

K.

ANHEIER, A VERSATILE AMERICAN INSTITUTION: THE

CHANGING IDEALS AND REALITIES OF PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 19-42 (2013).

5. See OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 11-17 (2012).
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a small portion of the value of a given donor's gift in any given year.6 By
holding spending down below the annual investment earnings and other
income of the foundation, the restricted-spending rules permit the
organization to grow ever larger.
Law assists the project of restricted spending in a variety of ways. The
federal government, and most states, award generous tax incentives for
making donations to charity. Those incentives do not depend at all on
when the charity spends the donated funds; the government offers the
same reward at the time of donation whether the charitable acts actually
occur the same year or centuries in the future. Because donors can usually
invest their tax savings for a profit over time, this structure provides a
powerful incentive to donate first and spend later. In some ways, as I'll
detail, the tax rewards for giving are even higher for gifts to organizations
that restrict their spending. Further, state organizational law imposes a
duty on managers to safeguard the wishes of donors who want to see their
money last in "perpetuity"; and, in more than a dozen states, the law
actually presumes that managers have failed that duty simply by spending
more than seven percent or so of their organization's assets in any year.
The result is that nearly a trillion dollars of philanthropic wealth now
sits on the sidelines, held in abeyance not just for tomorrow, but for the
indefinite future.8 Taxes paid by current taxpayers have bolstered these
funds in considerable measure. 9 Yet the benefits, if they ever arrive, will
be enjoyed mostly by future generations.
Surprisingly, there has been little serious scholarly attention to law's
role in restricted spending and the buildup of the philanthropic sector. A
handful of think-tank white papers and public policy journal articles have
batted around some basic ideas, such as whether we should care about
whether public funds pay for charity now or later.10 The closest to a

6. See LOREN RENZ & DAVID WOLCHECK, FOUND. CTR., PERPETUITY OR LIMITED LIFESPAN:
How Do FAMILY FOUNDATIONS DECIDE? 4 (2009), available at http://foundationcenter.org/
gainknowledge/research/pdf/perpetuity2009.pdf.
7. For detail on the points in this paragraph, see infra Part I.
8. See Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S., 2012, FOUND. CTR.,
http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/total/list/2012
(last visited Apr. 19,
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/AP7R-DHPE.
9. See Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, How Does the Incentive Effect of the
Charitable Deduction Vary Across Charities?, 88 ACCT. REV. 1069, 1071 (2012) (reporting that
private foundation donors are highly sensitive to tax incentives).
10. Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector's $100 Billion Opportunity, HARV. Bus. REV., May
2003, at 3, 3-11; Ren6e A. Irvin, Endowments: Stable Largesse or Distortion of the Polity?, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 445, 445 (2007); Akash Deep & Peter Frumkin, The Foundation Payout Puzzle 1-31
(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 9, 2001), available at https://www.hks.harvard.
edu/content/download/68878/1248322/version/1/file/workingpaper 9.pdf. Some foundation leaders
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complete exploration is an eight-page monograph from Stanford Professor
Michael Klausner." There has been no systematic examination of the
arguments for and against government support for restricted-spending
foundations and little effort to link the policy arguments to concrete legal
rules. This gap in theorizing has also produced a gap in empirical data:
because few people have been formulating the questions, we have not had
much research to tell us the answers.
This Article attempts to begin all these tasks. I critically examine prior
justifications for restricted spending and offer some new possibilities for
consideration. I show that in some cases theory doesn't take us all the way
to a conclusion and that we need more facts about how donors and
foundation managers actually behave. I attempt to fill in some of those
facts with original empirical data. And I then connect these tentative
findings with some basic principles for reforming the current
underpinnings of the law of restricted spending.
To preview the analysis in a bit more detail, I first examine the social
costs of restricted-spending rules. As others have acknowledged, setting
aside funds for the future reduces the efficacy of the resulting spending by
worsening the fit between society's needs and the donor's goals, and
heightens the cost of separating the uses of the money from the owner's
control.1 2 I add that waiting imposes other kinds of costs on governments,
beneficiaries, and the foundations themselves. Waiting sacrifices the
opportunity to learn from and build on charitable successes and failures,
and to invest in social programs with long-term rewards. It also shifts
money from a time when resources are relatively scarce (now) to a period

have weighed in, usually on the side of perpetual foundations. E.g., PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY,
MONEY WELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY 259-66 (2008); JOEL L.
FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 236-48 (2007); Carl J. Schramm, Law
Outside the Market: The Social Utility of the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355,
398-407 (2006). Evelyn Brody also has provided a fine overview of the history of the endowment

debate. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
873,899-944 (1997).
There have been notable articles analyzing the related question of wealth accumulation by
operating charities, such as universities and hospitals. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and
Endowments: Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 17 (2011); Henry
Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 14-39 (1990); Sarah E.
Waldeck, The Coming Showdown over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1795 (2009). As we will see, that question has some overlap with foundation spending, but also
many points of departure. See Waldeck, supra, at 1814 ("[Private-foundation] rule[s] ... reflect[]

policy concerns that are largely absent in the university context.").
11. Michael Klausner, When Time Isn't Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time Value of
Money, 1 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 51, 51-59 (2003).
12. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the PerpetualTrust, 50 UCLA L. REV.
1303, 1327-39 (2003).
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(the future) when, as I demonstrate with some new evidence, foundations
will be flush with cash.
On the other side, I argue that while there are strong arguments for
encouraging savings by charities, these arguments mostly don't support
current restricted-spending rules. For example, it is true that foundations
can develop expertise in their chosen policy areas and can serve as
laboratories and incubators for new ideas. 13 But preserving these
incubators doesn't demand restricted spending, as long as managers are
willing to seek out new funding-as indeed most commentators believe
they should. I also suggest that charity can usefully save to prepare for
times of future great need-but this implies that the organization should
also be free to spend profligately when the need arrives.
These analyses supply some basic principles for reforming current law.
While I leave development of exact details to await later work and better
data, I argue that at a minimum federal law should require many
foundations to pay out a considerably larger share of their assets each year
than it now does. Congress also should close the loopholes presented by
lightly regulated alternatives to the foundation form, especially those
offered by the so-called donor-advised funds. At the same time, good
policy might additionally include rewards or other positive incentives,
especially incentives for foundations to spend or loan out money during
recessions. State tax law could mirror these changes, and states should
likely abandon the current movement to impose a legal cap on annual
foundation spending.
At each stage of the analysis I supplement my argument with original
empirical data. Drawing on a database spanning twenty-five years and
thousands of foundations, I am able to offer at least preliminary evidence
on several key questions underlying the restricted-spending debate. I find,
for example, that foundation investments grow at about double the rate
claimed in earlier work funded by the foundation industry. I also find that,
including new contributions, foundation wealth is growing at more than
triple the rate advocates of restricted spending have suggested. The data
suggest that state laws setting a defeasible cap on spending in fact have
diminished spending. And I am able to run simulations to compare several
different policies for curing the problem of pro-cyclical foundation
spending. While these findings are hardly the last word on foundation
spending, they helpfully fill in holes in our current understanding.

13. See discussion infra Part JV.B.
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Part I of the Article lays out more detailed background on philanthropy
and the laws that subsidize it. In Part II, I consider Professor Klausner's
arguments that the concept of the time value of money should not apply to
foundations and show several significant gaps in his claims. Part III delves
into the social costs of restricted spending, while Part IV reviews old and
new arguments in its favor. Part V synthesizes the two into a set of policy
implications. The Appendix sets out technical details of the empirical
analysis appearing throughout.
I. BACKGROUND

Let's begin by clearing up some terminology. A foundation, in the
ordinary use of that word, is a charitable institution that exists to give
away money, usually to other charities. The tax code's definition doesn't
quite line up with general English usage. In tax lingo, a "private
foundation" is an organization that draws revenue from just a few
sources.1 4 In contrast, a "public charity" is generally one that derives
support from a relatively broad cross-section of the public. 15 Private
foundations are subject to rules and regulations, and even a small tax, from
which public charities are exempted. 16
Thus, some entities that the general public would think of as
"foundations" are not foundations for tax purposes. A common example
are the so-called "community foundations," which collect small donations
from the public and spend them in a concentrated geographic area.1 7 Other
entities that the tax code treats as "private foundations" may distribute few
funds, and instead focus on direct charitable service; the code calls these
private "operating foundation[s]. AS For simplicity, in this Article I use the
term "foundation" to refer generically to grant-making institutions,
whether they are treated as private foundations by the tax code or not.
A major recent alternative to the foundation form is the donor-advised
fund, or "DAF." A DAF is just an account, managed by a "sponsoring"

14. See ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 16.03 (LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2016).
15. See id. § 17.08.
16. George Johnson & David Jones, K. Community Foundations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1994), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopick94.pdf.
17. For a helpful overview, see Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax
Treatment of Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 141-42 (2002).

18. I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) (2014).
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nonprofit, holding assets contributed by a donor.1 9 The donor retains the
right to "advise" the nonprofit on how to spend the money. Once placed in
the account, the donated funds can be used only to support the sponsor or
other charities. 20 Since sponsors know they won't receive new
contributions if they ignore their donors' "advice," as a practical matter,
the donor remains in control of the funds. 21 Nonetheless, the donor can
claim a full deduction at the time the money is placed in the account.
Often, the sponsor will qualify as a "public charity," since by sponsoring
many accounts it can claim that its revenues derive from a broad crosssection of the community. 23 From the donor's perspective, though, the
DAF works much like a mini foundation, albeit not subject to the extra
rules that usually go with the foundation form.
The vast majority of foundations follow a policy of what I will call
"restricted spending., 24 Through the firm's organizational documents and
governing state law, the foundation's managers are constrained to spend
only a small fraction of the available assets each year. Sometimes this
constraint will be phrased as a percentage of the value of the firm's assets,
while in other instances it will be a more general instruction to pursue
a
25
strategy that will preserve the organization's assets "in perpetuity.,
As other scholars have demonstrated, the law is not simply neutral
towards restricted spending and the goal of perpetuity, but rather actively
supports them.26 The charitable contribution deduction is the first, and
probably largest, support. The federal government and most states allow
taxpayers to reduce their taxable income by the amount of any donation to
an eligible charity. 27 Similarly, decedents' estates can deduct the amount
of any money left to charity from the amount subject to federal tax. 28 In
effect, the deduction is a matching grant for the production of charitable
goods.2 9

19. Id. § 170(f)(18).
20. HowARD HUSOCK, MANHATTAN INST., GROWING GIVING: AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY AND
THE POTENTIAL OF DONOR-ADVISED FuNDS 2 (2015), available at https://www.manhattan-institute.o

rg/sites/default/files/cr 97.pdf.
21. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 170-71.
22. HUSOCK, supra note 20, at 2.
23. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 147.
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1282-83, 1305-06 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L.
REV. 283, 306-07 (2011); Hansmann, supra note 10, at 20; Irvin, supra note 10, at 454.
27. J.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2014).

28. Id. § 2055.
29. Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1568
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Allowing foundation donors to claim their deduction at the time of
contribution creates powerful incentives to give far in advance of when the
donor wants the money spent. 30 By accelerating her donation, the donor
can get the benefit of the government's subsidy sooner and invest that
money in the interim. This allows her to spend more in the future, or,
alternatively, to obtain the same future spending amount with a smaller
out-of-pocket outlay.

Commentators disagree about whether these incentives are costly to the
government. Michael Klausner argues that in many circumstances delayed
spending does not cost the government anything. 31 Assuming that the
foundation's assets are invested as profitably as the government's money
would have been, the delay does not reduce the present value of the
government's subsidy.32
An immediate deduction also makes restricted spending appealing if
the donor can make partial use of her money in the interim. For example,
commentators note that control of a foundation and its resources gives the
donor prestige, power, and influence. In the case of entrepreneurs who
donate corporate stock, the private foundation's founders and their heirs
can sit on its board and direct how the shares it holds are voted,

maintaining de facto control of the firm whose ownership they have in
form surrendered.34 To the extent that donating money directly to an
operating charity would not bring these same rewards, establishing a
foundation looks relatively more attractive.

(2013); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. C-i. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998).

30. Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments: Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized? (Part
II), 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125 (2011); Hansmann, supra note 10, at 20; Irvin, supra note 10, at
447; Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 C-1.KENT L. REV. 957, 968 (2010). For a formal mathematical analysis, see Carolyn B. Levine & Richard
C. Sansing, The Private Foundation Minimum Distribution Requirement and Public Policy, 36 J. AM.

TAX'N ASS'N 165, 167, 169-70 (2014).
31. Klausner, supra note 11, at 54. But see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Philanthropy's
New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 121, 121-22.
32. Klausner, supra note 11, at 54.
33. Levine & Sansing, supra note 30, at 169. This can be true of the estate tax deduction, as well.
For instance, suppose that Leona calculates that her heirs will want to give some money to charity
during their lifetimes, If she sets aside some money from her estate into a family foundation, she can
give her heirs three benefits: money to spend on charity, the power and prestige of the foundation, and
relief from the estate tax. If she simply left them the money, they would get only the cash left after the
estate tax's bite.
34. See I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2) (2014). Private foundations can't hold more than twenty percent of a
business, id., but this is a large enough block of a publicly traded firm to give effective control in many
instances. And firms can exceed the cap for as long as ten years after the gift. Id. § 4943(c)(6)-(7).
Even more flexibility is possible by using contingent voting rights or by setting voting thresholds for
certain key corporate actions in a way that gives the foundation an effective veto. Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4943-3 (2015).

1152

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1143

A less-familiar aspect of the rule allowing full deductibility for
restricted-spending gifts is that it facilitates tax planning. Donors can
contribute at the moment that the deduction will generate maximum
value-usually when their tax rate is highest or the value of the assets they
are contributing is at its peak-again without having to trade off that goal
against their preference for when to fund charitable projects.35
Thus, a common piece of tax advice given to entrepreneurs whose
firms are about to go public is that they should contribute a portion of their
stock to a new foundation or DAF.16 Assuming that the entrepreneur was
planning to donate someday, donating at the moment of the IPO
accelerates the deduction during a year when the entrepreneur's tax rate is
as high as it will ever be. It also allows the entrepreneur to claim the value
of the donated stock as a deduction at a time when that value, too, may be
at its peak.3 Government loses not only because of the timing and the rate
shift, but also because the value of the stock at the time it's ultimately sold
for charitable purposes may be less than the value of the deduction the
donor claimed.
As Dan Halperin has shown, another major tax subsidy for restricted
spending is the exclusion of foundation investment earnings from the
corporate income tax." By contributing their investment assets to a
foundation earlier than they want the funds spent, donors can allow those
investments to grow tax-free. In contrast, if they held the investments
themselves, they would often have to pay tax on any appreciation.
Professor Halperin acknowledges the counterargument that other tax
rules might allow for effectively the same treatment, 39 but this may be an
unnecessary concession. Donors who contribute publicly traded stock to a
foundation can deduct the full value of the gift without paying tax on their
built-in gains, seemingly achieving the same end result as early
contribution.4 0 To avoid all tax on her donated assets, though, the donor
must never exchange them, from the day she acquires them until the day
they are donated. This lock-in is itself economically costly, since it

35. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 171 (noting that DAFs allow donors to claim deductions in
high-income years).
36. E.g., Ryan Boland, The First (and Often Forgotten) Rule of Impactful Giving: Give the Right
Asset, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Oct. 2014, at 148, 152-53. DAFs have the advantage that they allow a

full market value deduction for the founder's stock, even if not publicly traded. See id. at 152.
37. See David Yermack, Deductio' ad absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to Their Own
Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 110-11 (2009) (reporting that stock donated to foundations
tends to decline in value after donation).
38. Halperin, supra note 26, at 288, 302, 305.
39. See id. at 308.
40. See Brody, supra note 10, at 944.
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prevents the donor from switching away from underperforming
investments. 4 1 At the margin, we would expect donors to accept a lock-in
cost of just a hair short of the full amount of the tax saved.4 2 So the ability
to contribute built-in-gain securities with no tax is less valuable than it
appears at first glance.
Finally, in addition to tax law, other legal rules help to underwrite
restricted spending. The state law of nonprofit organizations obliges
managers to obey the wishes of a donor who chooses to limit the uses of
her money.43 Charitable trusts are exempt from the rule against
perpetuities. 44 Other rules set a default that managers must operate a
foundation with the goal of preserving its resources in perpetuity. 45 As
with the laws of contract and business corporations, the existence of a
judicial apparatus for enforcing these guidelines is itself a modest
subsidy.4 6 More significantly, and unlike an ordinary business corporation,
state attorneys general are charged with enforcing managers' adherence to
nonprofit law. 47 Few do so with much vigor, 48 but donors can and often do
choose to incorporate in states, such as New York and California, with the
most active attorney general offices.49

In sum, the law not only tolerates restricted spending, but also actively
encourages donations to restricted-spending organizations. My goal for the
remainder of this Article will be to try to understand what, if anything, can
justify that choice.
II. THE TIME VALUE OF CHARITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Restricted-spending policies defer charitable good deeds into the
future. How should policy makers compare charity now against the benefit
of charity later? One standard tool in most policy contexts is present-value

41. See generally James M. Poterba, Taxation, Risk-Taking, and Household Portfolio Behavior,
in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1109-71 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002)
(describing effects of taxation on portfolio allocation).

42. Id.
43. Brody, supra note 10, at 877-80.
44. Id. at 877.

45. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4(a), (d) (2006).
46. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 Tx. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2010).
47. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 305-06 (2004).
48. See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 227,250-52.

49. See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State
Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128-29 (2007) (reporting number of each state's attorney general
employees assigned to charitable oversight).
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analysis, also called time discounting. Over the rest of this Article, I will
employ time-discounting analysis to evaluate restricted-spending policies.
The basic process is intuitive: I will ask whether the social welfare
produced by subsidizing restricted-spending policies is greater or less than
other possible uses of the government's money. Before I do that, though, I
must deal with a major critique of time discounting raised by Professor
Klausner, who claims that time discounting is "irrelevant" to the merits of
restricted spending.> In this Part, I will show that Klausner's description
of the significance of time discounting is no longer the most persuasive
and that, in the end, present value is and must be a key part of serious
policy analysis. That will set the stage for the two Parts to follow, each of
which is in a sense aimed at identifying what components should go into
our present-value analysis.
A. Time Discounting: A Review

It may be useful for some readers to begin with a review of the idea of
the time value of money. Most readers know that, all else equal, the
average investor would rather have money now than later.52 Suppose Kent
loans money to Lois. While Lois has the funds, Kent cannot invest them.
Therefore, Kent will want Lois to compensate him for the alternative
investments he could have made in the meantime. To simplify a bit, these
alternative investments are the time value of Kent's money.53 We might
then describe the value of some future promise to pay in terms of its
"discounted present value." 54 By this we just mean: how much money
would Kent have to invest today in order to have that much money at the
time of Lois's promised payment? The "discount rate" is the rate of return
that Kent would have earned on his money. 55
We can extend this same concept to governments. When a policy
maker is considering "investing" in some policy that will pay off in the
future, she should want to think about her opportunity cost. Which will
have a better payoff: building this bridge or instead investing the same

50.

RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

16 (6th

ed. 2000).
51. Klausner, supra note 11, at 53.
52. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 16.

53. Id. at 22. A more complete version of the tale would also account for the risk Kent takes that
Lois might not repay the debt. We might then separate the time value of money into purely riskless
waiting, "the risk-free rate of return," and a component that reflects the risky aspects. But that nuance
is not particularly important for our analysis here.
54. Id. at 18-19.
55. Id. at 17.
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money, collecting the proceeds, and spending the money later (on a bridge
or something else)? Using present-value analysis to appraise the future
value of projects implicitly builds in this opportunity-cost calculation: the
policy maker is deciding how many future dollars she is giving up,
assuming she could invest at the chosen discount rate.56
It isn't always easy to decide the correct discount rate. Sometimes, the
government is comparing two different cash payoffs-that is the easy
case. But many times, the government is comparing the non-cash payoff
from a policy "investment" against the cash payoff from investing the
policy's cost instead, or even against the non-cash payoffs from
implementing a different policyi While commentators mostly agree that
the discount rate is important to any inter-temporal policy choice, these
non-cash situations can raise special considerations that go into choosing
the correct rate. 58 Comparing cash to non-cash payoffs requires that both
payoffs be converted into some common denominator, such as "utility" or
well-being. Government shouldn't give up $500,000 worth of present
consumption unless the utility of the future payoff is greater than the
utility earned by investing the money. 9
Another complication is that investments may have different payoffs at
different points in time. Humans experience diminishing marginal utility
from wealth; each dollar is more important to us when we have only a
handful of them than when we have vaults stuffed with them.60 If future
beneficiaries of government spending will be richer than we are in the
present-as everyone expects they will be, on average-then the future
utility payoff from government spending is correspondingly lower.61

56. Id. at 16.
57.

KENNETH J. ARROW & MORDECAI KURZ, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, THE RATE OF RETURN, AND

OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY xxv (1971).
58. Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1101-20 (2011), and David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and
Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 433, 438-49 (2009),
summarize the debate. See also Revesz & Shahabian, supra, at 1145 (conceding the importance of
discounting but raising special considerations in the context of climate change).
59. See Bradley et al., supra note 10, at 7.
60.

JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 322 (3d ed. 2011).

61. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 130, 131 (James
P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee & Erik F. Haites eds., 1996); Partha Dasgupta, Discounting Climate Change,
37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 150-64 (2008).
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B. Is Time Money for Foundations?
Let's turn now to Klausner's critique. Although Professor Klausner
makes much of his rejection of time discounting, 62 at the end of the day he
accepts most of this framework. He agrees that the relative wealth of
current and future generations is an important factor in the spend/save
decision. 63 And, consistent with the discounting literature, he concludes
that charities should consider "how cost-effective a grant to current charity
would be, compared to future charity"-that is, that foundations should
consider opportunity costs. 64 He maintains, though, that foundation
savings shouldn't be compared against the government's potential
investment return or against the payoffs from short-run charitable projects
the foundation could have chosen to fund. 65 Both these claims rest on
66
unlikely assumptions.
First, Klausner's description of the reason planners discount future
payoffs by the government's investment rate is less convincing than other
accounts. Klausner claims that "by discounting future grants to present
value, we would be saying that" future people's lives are less important
"simply because [they] live at different times. ' ,6 7 As David Weisbach and
Cass Sunstein have explained, however, we could value future and present
lives equally and still want to consider the government's opportunity
costs. 6 8 Indeed, to do otherwise would be unethical: it would be throwing
money away, money that could benefit the present and future both. Again,

62. Klausner, supra note 11, at 52-55.
63. Id. at 57; see also Hansmann, supra note 10, at 14.
64. Klausner, supra note 11, at 57; see also Schramm, supra note 10, at 400.
65. Klausner, supra note 11, at 58.
66. In conversations after he generously agreed to read this draft, Professor Klausner suggests
that his article is not best read to make the argument I attribute to him here. Instead, he makes two
distinct points. First, that there should be no "pure time preference," that is, no discounting of the
returns to projects that benefit future generations solely because they are in the future. And, while he
agrees that saving should be compared with the opportunity cost of spending, he believes that using the
time value of money is an inapt way of accounting for opportunity cost.
Framed in this way, it may be that my differences with Professor Klausner are semantic. We both
would compare the total returns available throughout time from a spending project against those
available from investing funds instead. My view is that we can use the language and methodology of
time discounting to engage in that comparison, albeit using a "social" discount rate that reflects the
returns to spending projects, as well as a potentially negative adjustment to the rate of return earned by
investments to account for the costs of deferred spending I describe in the next Part. Klausner would
avoid using discount rates altogether, as he seems to believe they are too easily confused with pure
time preferences. He would instead simply add the value of each alternative over its expected life. And
he appears to conclude that there are a relatively narrow, albeit potentially important, set of spending
projects with the potential for long-term payoffs.
67. Id. at 53-54.
68. Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 450-51.
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by applying a market discount rate, in effect we are asking, "Which would
produce more wealth for the future: funding this project or investing the
money?" If the project would pay less than an investment would, how
does it serve the future to fund the project?
Klausner also is unpersuasive when he suggests that foundations (and,
presumably, the society that subsidizes them) need not weigh the benefit
of restricted spending against the lost opportunity to fund short-term
projects. 69 That is, his view seems to be that foundations don't have to
show that their investment returns exceed the "return" that spending could
produce. There are many ways charitable spending today could benefit the
future. Economic development might create a path of economic growth
that enriches later generations.70 Future research could build on presentday discoveries.7 But Klausner seemingly would consider these
alternatives only if the social return "continues in perpetuity" and
"produces benefits that compound . . .at a higher rate than assets in the
foundation's portfolio." 2
It looks, therefore, as though Klausner's objection to considering
opportunity costs is about math. The idea seems to be that, over an infinite
amount of time, a foundation's investment returns will outstrip the value
of any finite spending project. Only spending projects whose benefits
continue indefinitely are a better choice than investing, and even then only
if their "rates of return" are consistently higher. This fits with standard
models of capital budgeting-that is, plans for how to allocate firm
resources over time-which suggest that firms spend so as to obtain an
equal marginal return on their expenditures in each time period. v If the
firm plans to exist for an indefinite period, and if we assume that on
average the returns on expenditures are similar each year, it should spend
roughly its net-of-inflation investment returns each year. Spending out of
principal would reduce the marginal payoff in future periods, unless that
extra spending could itself provide value in future years in excess of the
investment return.
While the math here is right, the assumption that foundations will exist
literally forever is very implausible. Realistically, no foundation will live

69. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55.
70. See BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 261; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 4-5.
71. See Irvin, supra note 10, at 448.
72. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55, 57.
73. See ARROW & KURZ, supra note 57, at xx-xxi.
74. Perry Mehrling, Endowment Spending Policy: An Economist's Perspective, in FUTURES
FORUM 2004 53, 53-55 (2004); John E. Core & Thomas Donaldson, An Economic and Ethical
Approach to Charity and to Charity Endowments, 68 REV. Soc. ECON. 261, 269 (2010).
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on in perpetuity, even if we can't now predict its exact end date. So it is
inaccurate to compute the value of investing by assuming an infinite life.
But how long should we assume? Often, the answer doesn't matter.
Imagine that we are comparing the value of investing against a spending
project, using the standard compound-returns formula to compute each
one:
(Ui =P0 (1 + ri)n ) > < (U, =P0 (1 + r) m )

(1)

where U and U, are the utility payoffs from investing and spending, r is
the annual rate of return on each option, and n and m are the expected life
spans of the foundation and the spending project, respectively. If n and m
are equal, then we can cancel them from each side of the inequality, with
the result that we would choose whichever option has a higher rate of
return.
The expected life of the foundation will often drop out of our
calculations in this way because many projects a foundation takes on will
have an expected life as long as the foundation itself. Perhaps investing in
advances in chemotherapy will not have an infinite payout, assuming that
someday gene therapy will supersede chemo as a leading cancer treatment.
Will that day come before or after foundations are no longer a sensible
social arrangement, laws change, or future managers of the foundation find
a way to bring its operations to a halt?75 We don't know, and that makes
the expected life of the investment effectively the same as that of the
foundation.
Where then does this analysis leave us? As Klausner concedes,
foundations' decisions to restrict their spending should be measured
against the lost opportunities this decision presents.6 Doing otherwise
would cheat future generations as much as it would cheat present-day
taxpayers. In addition, I've argued here that to justify government support
for restricted spending, foundation savings should have to beat two
benchmarks. First, the utility payoff to future spending-net of all the
costs and benefits that delay might bring-should exceed the
government's investment opportunity: when the government gives
foundations a dollar, the utility of future spending should equal or exceed
the utility we could get from a dollar of present spending. Second, the net
payoff should exceed any returns that the foundation could achieve by

75. Cf Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 454-55 (noting that the duration of any intergenerational transfer is uncertain because of the possibility of acts by intervening generations).
76. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55-58; Hansmann, supra note 10, at 18.
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spending now on projects whose useful life is expected to be just as
"perpetual" as the foundation itself
III. THE COSTS OF WAITING

My argument so far is that it is important to consider whether the future
payoffs that a restricted-spending foundation can deliver are better than the
alternatives of unrestricted spending, or of eliminating the government's
subsidy and investing that money for some other kind of future spending
instead. In this Part, therefore, I examine some factors that might
potentially diminish the value of charitable spending deferred by
foundations into the future. I show that short-term spending can have longlasting impact, that future charitable spending is likely to be less valuable
because the growing philanthropic sector will have to turn to lowerpriority projects, and that spreading spending out over time introduces
several different forms of agency and information costs. In the last
Subpart, I'll discuss a counterargument that might apply to all these
points: that the charitable contribution deduction, by its very nature,
commits the decision to accept these costs to charities, not the
government.
A. Opportunity Costs

First, as we saw in Part II.B, even proponents of restricted spending
agree that foundations could increase returns to society by investing in
projects that last in perpetuity. Realistically speaking, those projects don't
have to last forever to, in expectation, beat foundation savings; they just
have to have an expected life that approximates the foundation's own.
Every one of these projects that goes unfunded due to government policies
favoring foundation savings is a waste of resources. If projects with this
kind of indefinitely lived value are rare, though, perhaps this is a minor
concern.
In fact, though, because foundations are engines for innovation, it very
well could be that almost every project in which a foundation engages
potentially has value that could continue growing as long as or longer than
the foundation itself. It might be the case that grants to provide hospice
care for the terminally ill won't benefit the future much directly, but
discovering new methods for delivering that care likely will. Every project
the foundation engages in can potentially be a source of information for
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the next grant, for other operating charities, and for other foundations."
Foundation advocates claim repeatedly that foundations are almost unique
in society in their power to use their grant-making ability to experiment,
measure outcomes, and derive lessons for the future. 78 If so, though, delays
in grant-making also deny the world the opportunity to benefit from those
lessons.
Even if not every project has this informational value, the claim that
time-limited projects inevitably pale in comparison to an opportunity to
invest forever is overstated. Again, it is unrealistic to believe foundations
really are timeless. Few foundations in the world today are more than one
hundred years old. 9 Compound interest for one or two hundred years is
powerful, but many time-limited projects could well rival that return,
especially if we expect that the product could outlive the foundations
themselves.
B. Diminishing MarginalReturns: Redistributionand the Growth of the
Foundation Sector
Next, future spending might deliver a smaller payoff than spending
today because of diminishing marginal returns. We have already seen one
aspect of that argument: future generations could be wealthier than ours,
on average. That implies that, if anything, we should borrow money from
the future and spend it today.8 o
Another possibility, with similar implications, is that the foundation
sector itself could be growing. Let's assume that foundations tend to fund
their highest-value projects first, however subjectively "value" is
defined.81 As the foundation sector expands, it will have to choose projects
lower and lower down on its list. The same is true of each individual
foundation, assuming that foundation managers have somewhat
idiosyncratic tastes relative to other managers: as the foundation gets
richer, its marginal project has a lower payoff. Standard capital budgeting
theory, we've seen, prescribes that a firm in that situation should
shift the
82
money to a time period when its marginal returns will be higher.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 3-9; Porter & Kramer, supra note 31, at 123-25.
BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 262463; Schramm, supra note 10, at 398-400,404.
ZUNZ, supra note 5, at 37-68.
Hansmann, supra note 10, at 14.
See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 257-82 (describing methods of prioritizing

projects for firms).
82. Cf Timothy R. Yoder & Brian P. McAllister, Do Private Foundations Increase Current
Distributionsto Qualify for a 50 Percent Tax Rate Reduction?, 34 J. AM. AcCT. ASS'N 45, 51 (2012)
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What's happening to the size of foundations and to the foundation
sector overall? In Part V.C.2, I report new empirical findings on the rate of
growth of foundation assets. To preview briefly, I find steady growth in
the real (i.e., net of inflation) value of private foundations' assets,
including investment income and new donations but omitting
expenditures-in other words, in the amount of money that would be
available for spending. Together, new contributions and investment
earnings offer a mean growth rate of about eighteen percent, after
inflation. The foundation sector, in other words, is growing rapidly, and
those figures do not include the even faster expansion of donor-advised
funds.
Unless Congress has some reason to believe that the marginal value of
future charitable spending will be higher than present charitable spending,
this trend seems to fly in the face of the capital budgeting principles I've
just outlined. Today's foundations should to some extent borrow against
the value of future foundation growth by spending down their assets and
letting new money replace those funds." To equalize marginal returns in
each period, assuming that on average projects of equal value are available
each year, foundations could spend up to their growth rate each yearhere, on the order of eighteen percent of their assets annually.
Current spending levels are considerably lower. Drawing on the sample
of tax returns described in the Appendix, I computed average payout rates
for organizations categorized as private foundations for tax purposes over
several recent decades.8 4 I separated spending rates according to whether
organizations have received any recent donations.8 5 This division is
intended to reflect the possibility that firms with active donors may behave
differently from those whose donors are deceased or otherwise no longer
actively involved with the firm. Figure 1 below summarizes the result.

("By distributing assets contemporaneously, foundations reduce their ability to distribute assets in the
future when a higher philanthropic return may be available."); Halperin, supra note 10 (suggesting that
endowment spending rules should account for future contributions).

83. Cf Deep & Fruinkin, supra note 10, at 8 ("The availability of... new funds for giving in the
future should make higher levels of giving today more appealing."). Admittedly, it is possible that the
marginal returns curve on foundation spending is very flat-that is, that marginal returns diminish very
slowly. This might be the case if foundations are now reaching only a small fraction of the neediest
charities.
84. My computation is simply an averaging across firms of the mean payout rate each firm
reported on its tax return for the five-year period ending in the return year. New firms, of course, may
report a period of fewer than five years, but for simplicity I include these together with other firms. I
winsorize the sample and weight firm observations by assets, as described in the Appendix.

85. I define "recent" as the tax return year and the four preceding years.
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FIGURE 1: SELF-REPORTED PAYOUT RATES AT PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS,
BY RECENT GIVING STATUS

Notes: Seltreported 5-year payout ratios. Winsorized and asset weighted. "Recent gifts are gifts
within 5 years of current period. Source: PF-SO1 2011 Cumulative File.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, average payout rates reported by private
foundations are well below sustainable levels. Indeed, among foundations
without recent gifts, payouts hover close to the statutory minimum of five
percent annually.
C. Project Selection, Agency Costs, and Information

As many prior commentators have observed, stretching foundation
spending over time tends to reduce the value of that spending through two
additional mechanisms. One is agency costs: over time, it becomes harder
for donors to constrain the impulses of managers who may prefer to hold
down spending in order to shield themselves from risk and reduce effort or
to spend in ways that contravene the donors' preferences.86 Another is

86. See Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers Part I: The Process, 3

NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP 117, 118 (1992) [hereinafter Salamon, The Process]; Deep
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information: even if donors could perfectly control their agents, the
donor's ability to best target her spending will get ever more stale over
time.8 7 In this Subpart, I want to add some less-familiar aspects of these
problems.
First, and most simply, a relatively unfamiliar argument about
restricted spending is that it presents an informational dilemma for the
government as well as for donors. In theory, government subsidies or other
incentives should be attuned so that the marginal social benefit generated
by another dollar of charitable activity is equal to the incentive's marginal
cost. 88 Restricted spending forces the government to forecast both, 89 and
the more restricted the spending is, the longer the range of the forecast. As
the forecast gets fuzzier, the likelihood increases that the government will
do something socially wasteful: either overpay to encourage behavior that
is not cost-effective or underpay and leave some beneficial behavior still
on the table. 90 Some scholars have argued that when the government faces
this level of uncertainty about the payoff from its policies, it should not
award up-front subsidies at all, but should instead wait until after the
behavior it wants to encourage occurs. 9 1
Second, recent work on the psychology of foundation managers
suggests yet another possible wedge that time might drive between the
manager and donor. Studies report that foundation managers are often
motivated in significant part by the amount of the assets under their
control, rather than by what those assets can accomplish-a classic
example of "empire building. 92 Managers also tend to favor accumulation

& Frumkin, supra note 10, at 7-8, 10-11 (noting, inter alia, that managers prefer restricted spending
because it protects their jobs, but describing this as an argument in favor of the practice). For evidence,
see John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Rodrigo S. Verdi, Agency Problems of Excess Endowment
Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 41 J. AcCT.& ECON. 307, 309 (2006), and Mihir A. Desai & Robert
J. Yetman, Constraining Managers Without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, 4 J.
GOVERNMENTAL & NONPROFIT AcCT. 53, 70 (2015).

87. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 33-34; Irvin, supra note 10, at 449; see also Brody, supra note
10, at 919, 922, 942. But see FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 246-47 (arguing that foundations are
valuable because they "allow the values of past generations to provide a counterweight to ... the
present").

88. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 135.
89. Recall that under current law, restricted spending is subsidized both through an up-front tax
deduction and also by an ongoing exemption for the investment returns of the charity.
90. See Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of
Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S256 (2011).
91. See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and
Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 200 (1977).
92. Gian Paolo Barbetta et al., The Impact of Fiscal Rules on the Grant-Making Behavior of

American Foundations 16 (UniversitAi Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Working Paper No. 9, 2012); Deep &
Frumkin, supra note 10, at 16-18.
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over program activities because of measurability bias: it is easier to
evaluate the performance of the firm's investments than of its programs,
and hence managers favor investing over spending. 93
A last point also deals with information, but it will take a bit of
unpacking. Let's begin by returning to the idea that firms optimally
allocate their resources when they equalize the marginal returns to
spending in each time period. This is as true of donee firms, the operating
charities, as it is for foundations. Restricted spending can interfere with
operating charities' ability to allocate their money. In essence, restricted
spending forces some operating charities to wait to obtain resources that in
some cases could have been spent more efficiently in earlier periods. For
instance, it is unlikely that the best use of a soup kitchen's money is to
have zero dollars for four years and then a million dollars in the fifth,
rather than $200,000 each year. Of course, if the operating foundation
could borrow, this wouldn't be a problem, but most charities are severely
credit-constrained, 94 and many nonprofit managers
are averse to taking on
95
debt that could increase the risk of bankruptcy.
Foundations could overcome this problem if they had perfect
information about the plans and operations of the donee firms. A perfectly
informed foundation would parcel out more or less money to each donee
each year, depending on the payoff. In other words, the foundation would
make grants that match the spending pattern the operating foundation
would choose. The problem, of course, is that the foundation managers
don't have that information, and they usually can't rely on the donee firm
to provide it. This information asymmetry problem comes up in many
other contexts, such as government grants and insurer-insured
relationships.96 In the literatures studying those fields, scholars report that
information transfers are imperfect because one party may have incentives
to only convey information favorable to its interests, because information
gathering is costly,
and because some crucial information may be hard to
9
reduce to writing.

93. Deep & Frunkin, supra note 10, at 16.
94. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 877 (1980); see
also Brody, supra note 10, at 889.
95. See Hansmann, supra note 10, at 36.
96. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the CapitalMarkets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 405, 420-26 (2001); Jonas Prager, Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from the
Private Sector, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 176, 179 (1994).
97.

See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 60 (1986).
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An alternative strategy for the foundation would be simply to award all
the money it plans to give to an operating charity up front and let the
donee firm allocate those funds over time, but that plan also has problems.
Once the donee firm has the funds, its managers may slack or diverge
from the plans they promised. Those managers also are unlikely to
surrender the funds in the event some other, more productive project
appears at another firm. Therefore, a donor might be willing to incur the
information costs of holding back funds in order to obtain greater
accountability and flexibility.98
While at first glance this theory seems to support restricted spending by
foundations, in fact it undermines it. Individual donors could obtain the
benefits of accountability and flexibility by holding donated funds in their
own name and then contributing directly to operating charities when the
time seems right. 99 Adding a foundation in between, and directing it to
restrict its spending, introduces exactly the two problems that waiting
supposedly solves: it allows the foundation managers to diverge from the
donor's preferences, and it reduces flexibility. Once funds are contributed
to the foundation, they cannot lawfully be returned to the donor.100 This
means that if the donor comes upon a highly productive investment
opportunity, she can't shift money from the foundation to that use (and
then potentially back again). 01
In short, restricted-spending foundations are likely to be less efficient
than foundations that award their funds quickly, because donee firms have
better information about when that money should be spent. Although
donors may be willing to pay that information cost in order to gain

98. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323-24 (1986) (arguing that the need to return to funders for additional
capital can reduce agency costs); Edward L. Glaeser, The Governance of Not-for-Profit Firms 37-44
(Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1954, 2002) (same). David Walker and I
report evidence that this theory also has some traction in the nonprofit setting, finding that dependence
on outside donors can affect the managerial decisions of university presidents. Brian Galle & David I.
Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and
Universities, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1881, 1917-18 (2014).
99. See FLEISWmAN, supra note 10, at 240-41 (2007) (noting that the two options are often

equivalent).
100. See LR.C. §§ 170(f)(3), 2055(e)(2) (2014).
101. Of course, the foundation could also pursue the investment opportunity available to the

donor. We know from recent work in international taxation, however, that the "lock up" of assets
inside a firm can create severe economic distortions. The identity of the owner of an investment can
matter a lot to how well that investment pays off. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules
and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937, 956-57 (2004).
Professors Klick and Sitkoff have shown evidence that the ownership of assets affects value in the
foundation context. Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidencefrom Hershey'sKiss-Off, 108 CoLUM. L. REV. 749, 814-16 (2008).
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accountability and flexibility, foundations reduce those two very things.
The accountability and flexibility factors could net out to either social
gains or losses from foundation restricted spending, but we presently have
no evidence on how they play out. For now, if we assume that they
roughly balance out on average, the net result is that restricted-spending
foundations create imperfect information without any offsetting benefit.
Having said all of that, there may be some situations in which it would
be beneficial for society to encourage donors to "lock up" their assets in a
foundation, even if that strategy reduces the value of the assets. For
instance, lockups may be a way of transferring resources from a time when
they have a low marginal utility (say, a booming economy) to a time when
they will have a higher marginal utility (say, a recession). We'll return to
that thought in Part IV.
D. Let Charity Decide?
Before moving on, though, I want to consider a counterargument that
could be raised to most or all the arguments I've addressed in this Part. A
standard view among most scholars of the nonprofit sector is that the
foibles of managers and errors of donors are the price society must pay for
the private production of public goods. 10 2 That is, since one of the central
goals of charity is to challenge or provide an alternative to majoritarian
government, the assumption is that it would be counterproductive to have
government bureaucrats or elected officials second-guessing or
influencing charities' choices.10 3 Putting this point another way, we might
say that the majority's dislike for a charity's choices shouldn't count as an
additional cost, since that very dislike is a reason for the subsidy. For
instance, I suggested that restricted spending could cause undesirable
redistribution, but some commentators believe that charities should be free
to be as redistributive (or not) as they choose.' 4
Whatever its general merits, this argument is not very persuasive as a
justification for policies that actually encourage restricted spending. It is
one thing to accept what to government eyes is wasteful charity when that
is the price of vibrant and diverse uses of the charitable contribution

102. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 22-24; Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433,462 (1960); see also Rob Atkinson,
Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1137-38 (1993).
103. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 23-24.
104. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 530-31 (2010) (identifying and critiquing theories that implicitly
adopt this view).
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deduction. It is another for government deliberately to set in place
additional policies that encourage waste. That is, if the only question were
whether restricted-spending charities should be eligible for the same
subsidies all other charities can claim, the answer might well be yes. But
the question instead is whether government's extra subsidies for restricted
spending-full deductions at the time of contribution, exemption of
investment earnings, and so on-can be justified. Denying those subsidies
does not sacrifice charitable autonomy, since the restricted-spending funds
could be given over to present-day charity instead.
Putting this point another way, we might say that our fundamental
policy question is whether foundation managers are likely to spend faster
or slower than the socially optimal level. As we have already seen,
managers have incentives and ways of thinking about restricted spending
that may cause them to tend to spend slower than an outside observer
would. Unless there is some story about why these incentives and frames
of reference reflect genuine charitable interests, and not externalities,
agency costs, and cognitive bias, the managerial preference for delay
would not seem to command the same kind of deference as other
charitable choices.
Limits on charitable choice are often defensible, in any event. For
example, when charities produce significant negative externalities, the
diversity rationale is harder to invoke: the charity is not only going its own
way, but is also dragging others along. As I've argued elsewhere, the
assumption that government cannot limit some charitable decisions
without threatening charitable independence underestimates tools of the
modern administrative state. 105 For instance, clear and simple rules can
limit the discretion of government actors who might disfavor unpopular
charities. Judicial review, and the threat of it and other kinds of outside
evaluation, also constrain administrative biases.
Limiting restricted spending fits this model of where government can
regulate charitable choice effectively. Restricted spending deprives the
future of information, renders operating charities less efficient, imposes
added enforcement costs on state attorneys general and the IRS, and
creates unwanted redistribution. With a few mechanical rules, such as
guidelines on how rapidly a firm should spend its assets, many of these
problems could be curtailed. Part V addresses some of these rules in more
detail.

105. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 848-50
(2012).
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IV. THE VALUE OF FUTURE SPENDING
So far, I've argued that restricted spending is socially costly in several
important respects. I now turn to considering the other side: what are the
benefits of paying out slowly over time? Earlier commentators have
identified five main arguments in favor of restricted spending. One, the
idea of intergenerational equity, we've already seen. That claim ultimately
depends on whether future spending might be more valuable than
spending today. While the other four arguments bear on that point, none is
persuasive. At best, they weigh in favor of long-lived entities, but not
necessarily long-term restrictions on spending by those entities. But there
are some other possibilities that have not been seriously developed
elsewhere that merit more thoughtful consideration. In particular, the
latent power of foundations to buoy the economy during recessions and to
rival the national government both could justify relatively long-term
spending projects. 106 I argue, though, that neither of these goals merits a
permanent endowment; both counsel that at some point spending limits
should be lifted.
A. PriorJustificationsfor Restricted Spending

Prior authors set out four basic claims about why restricted spending
might be more valuable than other forms of charity. Most simply, they
claim that donors value perpetual life. 10 7 This claim underwrites two
separate rationales for subsidizing perpetuities: first, that perpetual life
increases the "warm glow" donors experience;'08 and second, that in doing
so it also triggers increased total giving.109 Third, commentators argue that
foundations have institutional expertise or economies of scope that make
their spending more efficient, so that it would be wasteful for them to
close their doors after spending down their endowment.1 10 Lastly,
foundation advocates claim that a foundation's best project might not arise
for many years. None of these claims survives careful scrutiny.

106. Prior commentators have suggested that foundations could help to fight recessions, see
COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 3 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C.
Eugene Steuerle eds., 2006); Desai & Yetman, supra note 86, at 58, but have not explained why this
should be a task for the nonprofit sector in particular.
107. Irvin, supra note 10, at 449.
108. E.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Bequestsfor Purposes:A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33,
52, 53 & nn.74, 84 (1999).
109. Karst, supra note 102, at 475.
110. See infra Part IV.A.2.
NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENTS:
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1. DonorPreferencesfor Restricted Spending

No doubt, donors value long-lasting recognition for their generosity. A
visit to the entry hall of any museum or opera house can tell us that.111
Some commentators suggest that the opportunity to satisfy these
preferences is itself a reason to favor perpetual gifts. 112 Alternatively, and I
think more plausibly, others claim that allowing long-term restrictions on
gifts, especially restrictions on spending, encourages donors to give."'
I should first note that, as several eminent commentators have
observed, there is no empirical support for the proposition that restricted
spending encourages donations. 114 Donors may like perpetuities, but it
could be that those who value perpetuities the most are those who were
already the most inclined to donate. While prior studies find that donors
actively shop for states that will allow perpetual trusts, 1 5 that
jurisdictional competition seems entirely16 driven by federal tax benefits that
accompany trusts with unlimited lives.
In any event, the possibility that donors have preferences for limited
spending argues for lesser, not greater, government cash subsidies for
limited-spending gifts. In essence, we could think of the two approaches,
tax subsidies and government support for restricted spending, as
substitutes. I agree on this front with John Colombo, who points out that
government is justified in offering subsidies when markets fail, but that

111. William A. Drennan, Surnamed Charitable Trusts: Immortality at Taxpayer Expense, 61
ALA. L. REV. 225, 239-40 (2010).
112. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, THE URBAN INST. & THE HAUSER CTR. FOR NONPROFIT
ORGS., ACCUMULATIONS OF WEALTH BY NONPROFITS 2-3 (2004); Hirsch, supra note 108, at 84; see
also Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 11 (suggesting that preference of managers for conservative
spending is a reason to limit payout); cf Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1147-49 (2013) (making this argument in
support of donor conditions generally).
113. Charles H. Hamilton, Payout Redux, in VIII CONVERSATIONS ON PHILANTHROPY:
PHILANTHROPIC REFLECTIONS 28, 33 (2011); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND
117 (1955); Brody, supra note 10, at 942; see also Drennan, supra note 111, at 253 (noting this
argument).
114. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.3 (9th ed. 2014); 4A AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.4 (1989); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres
Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 357 (1999). Scott and others argue that history, in fact, teaches the
opposite, but historical anecdote admittedly cannot rule out possible confounding factors. Atkinson,
supra note 102, at 1133 n.79.
115. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356,410 (2005).
116. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of
the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2495-97 (2006).
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markets for naming rights seem to function just fine. 117 The more donors
want to give, the less the government needs to support their giving. If
donors want to give more when their gifts can be subject to restrictedspending rules, government's support in dollars can be lower.
In more technical terms, the greater self-satisfaction that comes with
permanent recognition implies that those donors are likely to be inframarginal: the government's cash, while costly to the public, does not
increase the donor's contribution.118 A third, closely-related point is that
the donors' utility is private consumption, while optimal subsidies for the
production of positive externalities should depend only on the spillover
benefits to others.11 9
Perhaps what prior commentators have meant to say is that rules
encouraging the use of perpetuities are a less socially costly way of
encouraging giving than tax subsidies.1 20 If so, this claim would be
dubious. One reason to doubt it is that the social costs of perpetuities are
not measured in any government budget. Since perpetuities are "off
budget," the political discipline that at least gently constrains most tax
incentives has not weighed on them. 121 In other words, it is unlikely that
society's choice to encourage perpetual gifts reflects a considered
judgment about their efficiency.
The best argument for the efficiency of perpetuities would likely be the
case in which there are some donors with strong preferences for future
spending, but only weak sensitivity to cash incentives. A pair of
economists recently predicted that perpetuities could increase giving under

117. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Integrating Theoriesfor the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657,
695, 699-700 (2001); see also William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable
Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 48, 69 (2011).
118. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009) (explaining that government
should not subsidize contributions from infra-marginal donors).
119. LouIs KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 28-29 (2008). In any

event, the donor's utility properly measured, is likely to be tiny relative to the costs of the
government's subsidies. Once the donor is dead, she no longer can care about her reputation. But see
THE SIXTH SENSE (Buena Vista Pictures 1999). She might take some bit of added satisfaction during
life at the thought of her name being carved in stone. Kelly, supra note 112, at 1147-49. But that

feeling is fleeting, while the government's subsidies will, by definition, last in perpetuity.
120. Or, as Peter Diamond suggests, of reducing the deadweight loss of progressive taxation. Peter
Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributionsfor Public Goods with and Without Warm
Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 898-99 (2006).
121. See Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 265, 286-88 (2012) (summarizing ways in which budgeting imposes political constraints on

spending).
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that assumption. 122 The existing evidence, though, largely suggests the
opposite: wealthy donors are both the most sensitive to tax
incentives and
1 23
also the most likely to give to restricted-spending vehicles.
Whatever the relative efficiency of taxes and perpetuities as stimulants
to giving, there still is no argument for granting more generous tax
subsidies when a gift carries spending restrictions. The whole premise of
the efficiency argument would be that restricted spending is useful because
it permits lesser tax subsidies. And it is similarly incoherent to offer tax
subsidies for perpetuities in order to appeal to donors who are indifferent
to tax subsidies.

I should emphasize that I am not proposing to outlaw perpetual gifts. I
agree with scholars who maintain that, all else equal, individuals have
some right to dispose of their property as they choose. 124 The question for
this Part is whether there are reasons to encourage restricted spending.
2. Firm-Specific Value
Another argument sometimes advanced for restricted-spending policies
is that grant-making institutions add value.1 25 For example, Paul Brest,
erstwhile Dean of Stanford Law School and former President of the
Hewlett Foundation, argues that major grant-making organizations have
developed expertise in their project areas, and have ties to networks 1of
26
experts who can support, guide, and evaluate the work of the grantees.
These kinds of expertise are closely tied up in human capital: the staff s
knowledge, their sense of how to work collaboratively with one another
and outside experts, and their ability to trust the judgment of their working
partners. While that capital could be replicated or reassembled, Brest

122. Levine & Sansing, supra note 30, at 167.
123.

See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: WHAT

TAX DATA CAN TELL US (2014) (reporting that giving to private foundations is predominantly from
the top one percent of households by income); LILY FAMILY SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA
UNIVERSITY, GIVING USA 2014, at 140 (2014); Jon Bakija, Tax Policy and Philanthropy:A Primeron
the Empirical Evidence for the United States and Its Implications, 80 SOC. RES. 557, 571 (2013)
(finding evidence that price-elasticity of giving is higher among higher-income donors). It is true that
some of the reason for the prevalence of wealthy donors in restricted-spending vehicles is the
relatively higher transaction costs of that form of giving, so that the pattern of observed giving may not
reflect solely the underlying preferences of donors. But the possibility that restricted gifts carry higher
transaction costs only serves to make our point about the lower efficiency of that form.
124. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 33.
125. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 264.
126. See id.
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suggests, doing so would be very costly. 127 Why, then, would we want to
force such an organization to spend all its money and dissolve?
Another way this point is sometimes put is that foundations generate
large economies of scope. 128 Society might get a much bigger bang for its
subsidy dollar by underwriting foundations, because the foundation is
overseeing many projects at once. That puts the foundation's staff in a
position to be able to compare the projects to each other, see potential
synergies, and apply lessons learned in one project to others. Joel
Fleishman, a Duke professor who once was a senior official at The
Atlantic Philanthropies, makes a version of this claim when he suggests
that foundations are a key source of policy experimentation: the
foundation can support several alternative ways of achieving the same
policy goal, then put its money
behind the one that proves to work best
129
time.
over
it
for
advocate
and
These are powerful arguments, but they make a case only for longlived institutions, not restricted spending. It is true that some
organizations, including Fleishman's own The Atlantic Philanthropies,
have decided intentionally to spend all of the foundation's available
funds. 13
The Gates Foundation's organizational documents also
reportedly require it to expend all available resources within fifty years of
the death of its founders.131 Spending the founder's money, though, need
not mean the end of the organization. Most charities raise new money
from donors and other sources. The Gates Foundation, for instance,
received a massive pledge from Warren Buffett, and Buffett demanded
that Gates spend some of the Foundation's
preexisting money each year as
13 2
a condition of receiving his donation.
Admittedly, Buffett's decision is unusual in that it appears that it is rare
for the very largest foundations to receive new contributions other than
from the founder and his or her family. 133 Individuals who plan on making

127. Id.
128. See George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102,

1150 (2004).
129. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 245-46.
130. HEIDI WALESON, BEYOND FIVE PERCENT: THE NEW FOUNDATION PAYOUT MENU 12-24

(2007),

available

at

http://community-wealth.org/content/beyond-five-percent-new-foundation-

payout-menu.
131. BREST& HARVEY, supra note 10, at 260.
132. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 237.
133. The Foundation Center reports that the fifty largest foundations in America received about

$9.5 billion in new gifts in 2012, against $10.7 billion in grants awarded and $209 billion in total
assets. Fiscal Totals of the 50 Largest Foundations in the U.S. by Total Assets, 2012, FOUND. CTR.,
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very large charitable contributions often prefer to establish their own
foundations, even when there may already
be other successful grant13 4
making institutions pursuing the same goals.
Yet even now, when policy gives them little reason to do so, many
foundations readily attract new gifts. In the dataset I constructed, one-third
of private foundations receive donations in a year other than their first year
in the dataset. Fourteen percent of firm-years see the firm take in more in
contributions than it spends. On average, foundations replace about sixtytwo percent of all their expenses with new contributions. I find, as prior
researchers also found, that it is mostly
the largest and oldest foundations
13 5
that tend not to receive new gifts.
To the extent that foundations don't bring in new revenues, the reasons
for that failure are not reasons the government should embrace. Donors
usually explain their preference for setting up their own foundations as
based on their desire to retain maximum control over their gifts. 13 6 Part of
it, no doubt, is also ego. 13 7 Alfred Nobel established his prize to change the
legacy attached to his name, not because he loved mankind.1" 8
Contributing money to a foundation named for someone else wouldn't
likely deliver the same reward. And, although donors rarely say so out
loud, controlled private foundations offer greater tax-planning
opportunities than contributing to someone else's charity.13 9 In addition,
managers of an existing foundation may prefer not to seek new revenues
because, as I have mentioned, it would tend to make them more
accountable to others.1 40 Prior studies also find evidence consistent with
the idea that nonprofit managers find fundraising personally unpleasant. 141

http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/top:assets/list/2012

(last visited Apr. 19,

2016), archived at https://perma.cc/L7B4-5JJ9.
134. See id.
135. See Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 65. In regression analysis, I find large and
statistically significant negative correlations between foundation age and new giving, and between
foundation size and new giving. Details of these regressions are available upon request.
136. Victoria B. Bjorklund, Giving to the Private Foundation, Donor-Advised Fund and
Supporting Organization, CS045 A.L. -A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 431,456,460 (2011).
137. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 45 (describing this as "the primary driver of the creation of

perpetual foundations").
138.

RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN

DEAD 87 (2010).
139. Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1169-70 (2008). For
example, a controlled private foundation can be granted stock without concern that it will exercise its
voting rights contrary to the interests of the controlling donor. See id.
140. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 82-83; cf. Drennan, supra note 111, at 229 (noting that
families may resist giving up control of foundations bearing their names).
141. James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising?
Evidence from a Panel of Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 335 (2011); Cagla Okten & Burton A.
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Still, an advocate for limited spending might say that, given these
natural human tendencies, limited spending is the price we must pay in
order to get the largest, very long-lived institutions. Yet none of these
behaviors is inevitable: for instance, donors also make very large
unrestricted gifts to universities-often with some naming rights attached,
but not necessarily the power to rename the whole institution. Managers
of operating charities do fundraise, even though they dislike it. 143 Both
parties can be incentivized to do the things that are needed to preserve
long-lasting institutions. The question again would be whether limited
spending is the least socially costly way of achieving the goal of
institutional expertise. If donors are reluctant to give to someone else's
foundation, why not change tax rules to encourage additional giving? Or,
if the problem is managers, perhaps imposing a higher mandatory payout
rate would motivate managers who want to retain their jobs to work harder
to bring in new money.
I also agree with Mark Hall and John Colombo's argument that the
ability to attract new donations is an important signal of an organization's
quality. 44 If individual donors no longer want to support the mission of a
foundation, what does that say about how well-spent the government's
subsidy dollars are? Hall and Colombo's critique is especially trenchant
for large foundations, which long have been criticized
for being insular
45
vehicles by which the super-rich can shape society.1
Scholarly work in the cognitive psychology of group decision making
also suggests that policy often is best made in settings where decision
makers know that there will be opportunities for those with differing
points of view to probe and challenge.146 In other words, I question

Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets, 75 J. PUB. EcON. 255, 267

(2000).
142. See Brody, supra note 10, at 884; Hansmann, supra note 10, at 8.
143. See Andreoni & Payne, supra note 141, at 335.
144. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption,

52 OIo ST. L.J. 1379, 1450-51 (1991); see also Tax Reform Act of 1969, 1969-3 C.B. 464 (justifying
statutory limits on nonprofit borrowing on the ground that nonprofits could otherwise expand without
the need for additional donations); Irvin, supra note 10, at 449; see also generally S. REP. No. 91-552
(1969).
145. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of GovernmentNonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 99, 112 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987).
146.

CARLOS SANTIAGO

NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

117-28

(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 10508 (2000). This could also be spun as a negative feature of new donations, however. By introducing
new points of view, the charity may cause donors to worry that other donors will act at cross-purposes
to their own, introducing cross-monitoring costs. See Triantis, supra note 128, at 1147-48.
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whether an organization that need never raise new money really can
achieve the kind of institutional expertise and openness to new ideas
championed by Professors Brest and Fleishman. In contrast, rules that
incentivize the organization to demonstrate the worth of its mission to
outsiders help to open doors, or at least windows, into the closed interiors
of philanthropic power.
In sum, to the extent that the institutional expertise arguments have any
power, it is only with respect to a small subset of restricted-spending
organizations. Only those large, old, and vibrant enough to have developed
significant irreplaceable human capital, or capable of carrying out
extensive policy experimentation, can claim the benefit at all. And only
those organizations seem to need restricted spending to protect their
extended lives; other philanthropies have little trouble raising new money.
3. Real Option Value of Waiting

A last argument one sometimes reads from restricted-spending
advocates is that a foundation's best project is not always available
immediately. 147 For instance, the Gates Foundation wants to combat
malaria. Should it put all its billions into the first malaria vaccine that
comes along? Or should it try to develop several potential solutions,
saving its biggest expenditures for the one that proves most promising?
This second route has an intuitive appeal, and the underlying insight is
sometimes called "real option value. 1 48 By waiting, we get more
information
about the world, and that can allow us to make better
49
choices.

Economic models of real options suggest that waiting isn't an
unmitigated good.1 50 Instead, there is an optimal balance between waiting
and acting. Even for actors with theoretically infinite lives, waiting can
mean missing out on opportunities that might have turned out to be the
best choice.1 52 At some point, Gates has to get behind one of its vaccine
manufacturers, before they all go out of business. Real option theory may

147. Irvin, supra note 10, at 449-50; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 12-13.
148. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 619; Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder,
Valuing Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. FIN. 549, 549-50 (1990).
149. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 625. Relatedly, foundations may serve as
intermediaries whose greater capacity to investigate and verify service organizations makes them
valuable sources of seed capital. Triantis, supra note 128, at 1160. But this, too, is a story in which,
while saving is useful, the foundation must constantly spend to make the savings worthwhile.
150. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 625-28.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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justify some degree of savings, but in the end it's a theory of action, not
inaction.
Real options also don't offer much support for awarding subsidies to
donors at the time of their gift, rather than the time the foundation spends
the contribution. What value is created for society by the Gates
Foundation's holding Bill Gates's money as it searches for the best ways
to spend it? What difference would it make if Gates himself held the bulk
of the funds, then contributed the rest when the Foundation informed him
it had found the right target? If anything, placing the money in the
Foundation's hands shifts the administrative costs of investing the funds to
the Foundation, and introduces the kind of agency costs I discussed in Part
111.153
B. New Arguments for Restricted Spending
In addition to the possibilities other commentators have raised, I want
to raise some additional potential benefits from the accumulation of wealth
by philanthropic organizations. In earlier theoretical work, I argued that
the best justification for subsidies for the charitable sector may be the
sector's potential to achieve what local governments cannot: spend during
times of acute need, compete effectively with the federal government, and
conduct guided policy experiments, among other goals. 154 Each of these
three achievements likely requires some buildup of charitable assets over
time. I'll now claim, however, that rather than prescribing accumulation of
unlimited wealth over endless periods of time by private foundations,
these policies generally weigh in favor of limited savings, call for
occasional aggressive spending, and may make more sense for operating
charities than private foundations.
As a prelude to this analysis, I should mention that the traditional
rationale for government support of charities is that charity is basically a
delivery vehicle for positive externality goods that neither government nor
market would otherwise provide. 155 So, for example, charity can pursue
goals that could not command a majority of voters. In this Subpart, I will

153. Perhaps the firm can do slightly better long-range planning when it has actual title to the
donation, rather than just a pledge by Gates to commit the money in the future. But that seems a fairly
slender benefit.
154. Galle, supra note 105, at 835-40.
155. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 175-83 (Edmund S. Phelps ed.,
1975); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393,
1399 (1988).
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build on some additional examples of instances in which charities can
succeed while governments fail.
1. CrisisSpending
One key example where governments predictably fail is crisis
spending. 156 Private citizens should want to buy insurance or build up a
buffer stock of savings against the possibility of bad times, such as natural
disasters or recessions.1 57 But because of asymmetric information between
individuals and insurers, markets for these kinds of insurance are
overpriced, unavailable, or otherwise "incomplete," which is a nice way of
saying that they fail. 158 Governments can and often should step in to
provide fallback social insurance, whether in the form of disaster
insurance, unemployment insurance, or fiscal stimulus (that is, extra
spending or tax cuts) during recessions. 159 However, for a variety of
reasons I have sketched in earlier work, government-especially state and
local government-also performs poorly during recessions. 16 Historically,
US states have tended to cut spending and raise taxes during recessions,
which is the exact opposite of what they should be doing. 16' Federal relief
arrives more consistently, but often at the wrong times and aimed at the
wrong people.162
Nonprofits can and should step in to fill this gap, but they face some
practical obstacles in doing so. Donations to charity fall during
recessions.
Logically, donors are more likely to give when they have
more available, and recessions can squeeze even the most generous.
Wealthy individuals with no credit constraints, however, should be
indifferent to current market fluctuations: they should anticipate that

156. Galle, supra note 105, at 823-24.
157. See Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).
158. Id. at4.

159. As with any insurance, government social insurance can give rise to bad incentives on the
part of those who are insured, often called "moral hazard." Good social insurance programs will
include design features that balance the cost of moral hazard against the benefits of helping citizens
deal with risk.
160. Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195-210 (2010).
161. Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An
Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 22 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2010); David A. Super, Rethinking
FiscalFederalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609-10 (2005).

162. Super, supra note 161, at 2608. Danshera Cords provides a similar account of charitable
efforts in relief of natural disasters. Danshera Cords, Charity Begins at Home? An Exploration of the
Systemic Distortions Resulting from Post-Disaster Giving Incentives, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 213, 234-36
(2014).
163. Irvin, supra note 10, at 450.

1178

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1143

markets will rebound, and donate out of future wealth. 164 That they seem
not to fully do so tells us that the dip in giving may also be attributable to
some other factor, such as tax policy.
Tax incentives for giving are also weaker during recessions. As current
incomes fall, so do marginal tax rates, reducing the size of the
government's matching grant. 165 Further, recall that a major tax advantage
for donations of securities is that they allow the donor to deduct the full
value of the security, without paying tax on the gains. During recessions,
when the stock market is weaker, the securities held by potential donors
166
are usually worth less, making both of these tax incentives less valuable.
Foundations might therefore serve as private piggy banks for the
charity world. Governments would like to save for future crises, but
struggle to do so in the face of political preferences for the present. Tax
subsidies for foundations would be the equivalent of a government
contract with private parties to save in government's stead.
Even so, private foundation savings may not contribute much to the
problem of crisis spending. Instead of paying for foundation savings,
government could find ways of encouraging greater donations during
times of need, as it did following Hurricane Katrina and other recent
disasters.167 That would tend to reduce the need for charities to build up
funds in anticipation of crises. On the other hand, it might be difficult for
operating charities to absorb huge influxes of new funds over short
periods. 6 ' But that still doesn't necessarily support foundation savings
since new funds would be hard to absorb, whatever their source. It might
be better for the operating charities to decide for themselves when to save
and when to spend; for then such charities might use excess funds during
non-crisis times to build infrastructure and response capabilities.
Another difficulty with offering more generous subsidies for new
donations in times of need is that donor responses to crises can also be
somewhat inefficient, with gifts flowing to areas that get more press
coverage, rather than those that may offer the greatest social benefit. 69 On

164. See Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does CharitableGiving Respond to Incentives and
Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT'L TAX J. 615, 620 (2011).
165. Triantis, supra note 128, at 1146.
166. See Bakija & Heim, supra note 164, at 619.
167. See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of
UnfortunateEvents, 56 DuKE L.J. 51, 53-56 (2006).
168. Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 13.
169. Cords, supra note 162, at 249.

2016]

PAY IT FORWARD?

1179

that front, at least, 1foundations can help by using more rigorous methods
for directing funds. 70
Whatever the theoretical case for private foundation savings as a cure
for crisis, in the real world, private foundations don't seem to pursue that
goal. Foundation spending is flat or lower during recessions. 1 1 As a result,
it is difficult to justify current foundation limited-spending policies on the
basis that these policies allow for greater spending when economic need is
greatest. In Part V, I discuss some possible ways in which a limitedspending rule could be reshaped to better fit with this goal.
2. A FederalAlternative

A second instance where federated government often fails to produce a
diverse array of policy choices for citizens is in the delivery of public
goods whose benefits are spread relatively thinly across many different
states.1 72 When benefits spill over in this way, it is rational for each state
and local government to aim to free ride on the efforts of others, and
assembling an inter-jurisdictional special government entity to deal with
the problem is costly and politically fraught.1 3 As a result, the national
government rarely has direct state competitors in important policy areas
such as international aid, wildlife and natural resource conservation, basic
science funding, and the like.174 Charities offer the public an alternative to
exclusive reliance on their national elected officials, and by providing
competition or a yardstick
for comparison can help to force those officials
1 5
7
better.
perform
to
We live in a big country, though, with big problems. The federal
alternative story may require similarly large stores of charitable resources.
Perhaps to be effective at the regional
or national level, the charitable
17
sector must build a deep pool of funds. 6

170. Foundations might also be able to respond more quickly than individual donors. See Triantis,
supra note 128, at 1147.
171. Irvin, supra note 10, at 450-51. I also perform regression analysis, using the data set
described in the Appendix, to determine whether foundations increase spending when their home
states are suffering through recessionary periods. I find a slight but statistically significant negative
effect of recessions on foundation spending. Full regression results are available on request.
172. Galle, supra note 105, at 822-25.
173. Id. at 823.
174. Id. at 810.
175. Id. at 822-23.
176. Cf. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 247 (arguing that perpetual foundations are better able to

"stand up" to government because they can use "slow, steady pressure"); Marsh, supra note 17, at 169
(suggesting that foundations can "tackle large community projects" because they are able to
"concentrate capital").
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As with crisis spending, it isn't clear that foundation savings are the
best source of savings for this kind of future need. As national aggregator
organizations such as the United Way show, the resources to achieve
national influence need not come from one donor, whose seed money must
then snowball over time. Put another way, the national influence story
doesn't clearly establish whether any particular donation should be used
for one large project or instead for a steady stream of small ones.
Further, operating charities, too, can build their resources to the point
where they can be effective across a wide geographic area. Operating
charities might also be perfectly effective if there are many small
organizations that in the aggregate are able to get things done. That is
largely the model of US international aid organizations; basic science,
similarly, can be funded a handful of labs at a time. 177 Or national
influence service organizations could be funded with an ongoing, rolling
stream of contributions from individual donors and moderate-sized
foundations. On the other hand, having centralized funding to guide and
evaluate new projects is likely important to their ultimate success.
Nor does the need for large organizations justify government support
for gifts with indefinite or inflexible restricted-spending provisions. It may
take time to build a firm to the point where it can meaningfully pursue
nationwide projects. But at some point the firm reaches that scale. Under a
restricted-spending rule, the time it takes the firm to achieve the
appropriate scale for a national-level project is far longer: because the firm
is bound to spending only a small fraction of its assets each year, it must
wait until its assets grow to something like twenty times the annual
spending it will need.1 7S In contrast, a firm that was free to spend, say,
1 79
twenty percent of its assets in a year could launch its project far sooner.

177. See Jon Bennett, Introduction: Recent Trends in Relief Aid: Structural Crisis and the Quest
for a New Consensus, in MEETING NEEDS: NGO COORDINATION IN PRACTICE xi-xxi (Jon Bennett ed.,
2013) (summarizing studies of how NGOs deliver international aid).
178. Cf FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 243 (explaining how spending limits postpone effective

spending).
179. For example, suppose the foundation begins with a $10 million bequest and wants to be able
to fund a $20 million project. Under a 5% payout limit, the foundation must have a $400 million
endowment before it can spend that much. A firm that can spend up to 20% of its assets need only
accumulate $100 million. How long will it take, assuming a 10% rate of return, to reach those
numbers? The standard formula is n

log(FV)- og(PV) Plugging our made-up values into this formula,
log(1+i)

it would take about 38.7 years to reach $400 million, but only 24.2 years to reach $100 million. The
example simplifies the real world a bit, because foundations with limited payouts may be able to skip
payout years and build up to a larger one-year expenditure. This would complicate our math, but the
upshot-that the less restricted firm could hit its target much sooner-would remain the same.
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In short, a firm with national ambitions must be free to spend in large
chunks at times when an opportunity to effect broad change arises. While
foundations are a vital alternative to government, there is little reason to
believe that ever greater wealth accumulation is necessary for, or even
consistent with, that goal.
C. A Review
Let's step back for a moment to assess where the argument so far has
taken us. As I've framed it, the basic question is whether subsidizing
restricted-spending charity is a better use of the government's resources
than other alternatives. One alternative would be for the government to
invest its money, and then later devote the resulting payoff to charity or
some other worthwhile project. Another would be to fund charities that
will spend the subsidy relatively quickly.
While I cannot put precise numbers on any of the three options, the
analysis so far suggests that restricted spending, except within certain
limits, usually will have less value than either of the other choices. For
instance, compare restricted spending with government savings. Both
government and foundations will likely earn similar investment returns.
The problem is that the utility payoff from foundation spending diminishes
over time, as the usefulness of each dollar declines with the expanding
foundation sector, and agency and information costs eat away at the
sector's advantages. Or compare restricted-spending charity with funding
operating charities that will quickly spend the funds. Here, the unrestricted
alternative's advantages are that current programs generate learning
externalities for present and future charity and that a dollar spent now,
when the world is needier, pays more than a dollar spent in the future.
As Part IV has shown, there are counterarguments for restrictedspending policies, but those arguments seem limited in scope. Foundations
with a pool of assets can serve important roles, but those roles often
demand flexibility to spend in times of great need or great opportunity.
And, by fundraising, foundations can serve that role without the need for
preserving the perpetual existence of any particular donor's contribution.
At best, the argument for restricted-spending subsidies would be an
argument that foundations should not have to attract new donors, but if
anything the opposite would seem to be true.
What, then, is to be done?
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: PAYOUT RULES AND BEYOND

Let's now turn from theory to policy. So far, my argument is that longterm restricted spending is socially costly and, at a minimum, should
probably not be subsidized. However, as I will explain in Subpart V.A,
simply eliminating existing federal subsidies for restricted-spending
foundations is problematic. I'll therefore consider a series of possible
alternative approaches to at least mitigate the worst aspects of restricted
spending in private foundations and to shape restricted-spending policies
to more closely resemble their theoretical justifications. In other words, in
Parts V.B through V.E, I work through ways to encourage foundations to
spend money faster and also to spend more intensively during times of
great need. Part V.F will then move on to focus on restricted spending in a
popular new substitute for private foundations, the so-called donor-advised
fund. Finally, Part V.G looks at recently adopted state laws that encourage
restricted spending. I report, for the first time, evidence of the impact these
laws have had on foundation policy-to preview, they have indeed
reduced spending by some measures-and then make a case for their
outright repeal.
A. Existing Subsidies Are Hard to Repeal

Part I sketched the two main ways in which federal tax policy is
currently underwriting restricted spending. First, donors receive a
deduction at the time of their contribution to a foundation, irrespective of
when the foundation spends that money. Second, the investment returns
the foundation earns on that money are tax-free, so that it is taxadvantaged to have the foundation hold profitable assets over time.
While one approach to fixing the restricted-spending problem would be
to just repeal or greatly limit these tax advantages,180 full repeal seems
impractical, at least for the immediate deduction. For example, suppose
that Congress were to defer a donor's deduction or a portion of it until the
donated funds were actually expended by the foundation. 181 Because
money is fungible, such a rule would not necessarily increase the amount
of money actually appropriated each year by foundations, at least at
organizations that borrow, have received multiple gifts, or have other

180. See Brody, supra note 10, at 945 (noting this possibility).
181. See Gerzog, supra note 139, at 1180; Halperin, supra note 30; Madoff, supra note 30, at 974.
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sources of revenue. 18 2 The Foundation might spend more of Bill Gates's
money now, but reduce the money it was spending out of its small donor
fund or its special event revenues. Non-donative, non-investment revenues
are empirically significant. For instance, in my sample, "other" income
accounts for about 4% of total foundation inflows.183
Death, too, complicates any repeal plan. Repeal would put pressure on
foundations to spend earlier so that donors could claim their deductions
sooner. But once a taxpayer no longer has a stream of income against
which to claim her deductions-for instance, because she's deceased-the
foundation no longer would have any incentive to accelerate payouts.
Delaying the deduction would also be complex to implement for bequests.
Presumably, large estates would be denied a full deduction against the
estate tax in the year of death, 8 4 but then entitled to partial refunds over
time as the bequest is spent down by the donee organization. This could
entail burdensome record-keeping over many years, as well as potential
legal uncertainty about how to divide the refunds among various heirs.
Rules applicable to new donations also would not affect any restrictedspending rules that now bind the nearly one trillion dollars in existing
private foundation wealth. 8 5 Deductions to organizations that do not pay
out old wealth could be curtailed, but that would just encourage donors to
form new foundations, leaving old money still subject to old rules.
While the administrative obstacles to taxing foundation investment
earnings are not as substantial, there may be economic side-effects that
make that option undesirable. Current law already imposes a small tax of
1% to 2%, as I will detail a bit more in Part IV.C, so there would be little
direct administrative burden from simply increasing the rate. 8 6 But it is far
from clear that it would be optimal to impose the same tax on charitable
investments as other businesses or individual investors face. A tax on
foundation investment assets could encourage spending, but in some
situations could also discourage it, and would introduce other changes in
managers' behavior as well. The optimal tax rate would represent a
balance between these factors. In order to explain the tradeoffs fully, I will
first have to explore some other legal rules that currently govern

182. See Halperin, supra note 30 (noting this problem with a rule requiring spending out of
endowment).
183. See infratbl.A.1.
184. See I.R.C. § 2055 (2014).
185. See Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S., 2012, supra note 8.
186. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2014). A potential complication, as Dan Halperin notes, is that if the tax
were large enough Congress would likely have to also change some of the rules for taxes on unrelated
business income. Halperin, supra note 26, at 306.
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foundation payout, and so I will defer a complete discussion until Part
V.C. For now, it is enough to say that it is unlikely government would
want to fully repeal foundations' exemption for investment income.
B. Time-Neutral ContributionDeductions

If outright repeal of foundations' tax advantages is not an attractive
policy option, what other choices are there? One option would be to target
donor incentives. We have seen that a key flaw in the current system is
that it incentivizes donors to prefer restricted spending, because restricted
spending increases the total subsidy available from the government. 187 In
general, in a well-functioning market we should expect private actors to
make decisions that maximize their own welfare.1 88 Government should
not distort private choices unless the market "fails" or otherwise goes
wrong. 89 Since there is no reason to believe that firms would otherwise
spend faster than society would prefer, the tax system should strive to be
neutral about the timing of expenditures. If we cannot readily remove the
tax subsidy for restricted spending available to firms, we should alter
donor incentives to leave the system neutral overall. 90
Prior commentators have proposed fully disallowing any deduction for
permanently restricted gifts (albeit in the university, not private
foundation, context), but Congress likely need not go that far. 91 An
alternative approach would be to reduce the value of a charitable

187. It might be argued that when foundations are considered in the larger context of the income
tax as a whole, the exemption of their investment income in fact is "neutral." The argument would be
that an income tax creates a substitution effect in favor of faster consumption, because it reduces the
returns to savings. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 650 (modeling effect of an income tax on savings).
The tax exemption for restricted spending firms then restores donors to indifference between spending
money on charity now or spending it later. But this argument goes astray because most other savings
options in our tax system remain subject to tax. Therefore, the exemption still distorts the donor's
choice about whether to place money in a restricted-spending vehicle or to keep or spend it elsewhere.
188. See id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. I should note that existing law already mildly penalizes donations to private foundations,
such as through a modestly lower cap on annual giving and reduced benefits for in-kind gifts other
than publicly traded stock. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D), (e)(1)(B) (2014). But these rules apply regardless of
how fast or slow the organization spends.
191. Herwig Schlunk, An Argument for the Repeal of Tax Preferences for Educational
Endowments 22 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-37, 2009);
Waldeck, supra note 10, at 1818; see also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44293, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS: OVERVIEW AND TAX POLICY OPTIONS 19 (2015)
(citing Examining the Rising Costs of Higher Education: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Brian Galle, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/39840295/)
(examining the possibility of reducing the value of the deduction for restricted gifts).
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contribution deduction by the amount of any tax benefits that derive from
restricted spending. This calculation would not be an exact science. The
general idea, though, would be to make some reasonable estimates about
the value of the perpetual exemption from tax on investment earnings,
discount that total to present value, and subtract the result from the donor's
initial deduction. As Herwig Schlunk has shown, the exact value depends
on what we expect the foundation's average rate of pre-tax returns will
be. 192 Congress or Treasury would have to make an educated guess about
that number and could adjust it periodically.
To illustrate, suppose that in year one donor A makes a restricted gift
of $1 million to Foundation Z. The gift is subject to a restriction that
Foundation Z maintain the real value of the gift in perpetuity. Let us
assume that the discounted present value of the tax benefits from
exempting an infinite series of Foundation Z's resulting investment returns
converges to $100,000. Donor A would reduce her charitable contribution
deduction in year one from $1 million to $900,000.
Admittedly, this proposal has some important limitations. Like outright
repeal of existing time preferences, it would not affect any assets already
under management by philanthropic organizations. Further, some donors
may be relatively indifferent to the charitable contribution deduction. The
tax rules facing many entrepreneurs are already so favorable that they have
relatively little need for yet another means of reducing their income. 93
Other donors, such as the Gateses, may have such massive deductions
relative to income that they already 1 will
be unable to use more than a
94
fraction of their income tax deduction.
C. Section 4942: FederallyRequired Payouts

In light of these obstacles, and the likely political difficulty in changing
the rules for charitable contributions, it is worth examining other options
as well. Another obvious possibility, which Congress already is employing
to a limited extent, is to require that foundations loosen the knots of

192. Schlunk, supra note 191, at 8-9.
193. David J. Herzig, Why We Should Stop Slamming Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan's
Philanthropic Plans, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2015/12/09/why-we-should-stop-slamming-mark-zuckerberg-and-priscilla-chans-phil anthropicplans/.
194. Estate-planning techniques could potentially substitute for the lost value of the charitable
contribution deduction from the estate tax, although these techniques may be less effective than is
commonly assumed. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a
"Voluntary" Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 158-68 (2009).
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restricted-spending rules. That is, Congress can set a payout rate-a
minimum amount of annual spending for foundations each year. Under
current law, organizations that are categorized as private foundations for
tax law purposes must annually spend at least 5% of the net investment
assets they held at the end of the previous year. 195 Qualifying expenditures
include grant distributions to operating charities, as well as salary and
other administrative costs. 196 Private foundations that can show they are
saving up for a large future
expenditure can get a temporary waiver of the
19
spending requirement. 7
The payout rate should be much higher. When Congress adopted the
current rule in 1981, its explanation was that 5% is the maximum
sustainable payout.198 Foundation advocates presented Congress with the
results of studies suggesting that the real rate of return on foundation
assets averages about 5%.199 Any higher and foundation assets would tend
to diminish over time, assuming no new contributions. I will now argue,
though, that both these assumptions are flawed: real rates of return are
much higher than 5%, and new contributions largely offset expenditures.
1. New Data on Real Rates of Return
Even accepting the premise that foundations should be able to sustain
themselves indefinitely without attracting new donors, the best evidence
actually demonstrates that average sustainable payout rates are
considerably higher than 5%. Since in my view prior studies all have
significant flaws, I present new data drawn from a large sample of
foundations.
First, though, I should describe the prior studies and their problems.
One early set of studies was built around simulations. 200 The authors
looked at some basic surveys of how foundations allocate their assets
between stocks and bonds. 201 Using average market performance for those
two categories, they computed the expected returns for typical foundation

195. J.R.C. § 4942(a), (e) (2014).
196. Id. § 4942(g)(1)(A).
197. Id. § 4942(g)(2).

198. C. Eugene Steuerle, Distribution Requirements for Foundations, 70 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON
TAx'N 423,424 (1977).
199. Id.
200. DEMARCHE Assocs., INC., PAYOUT POLICIES AND INVESTMENT PLANNING FOR
FOUNDATIONS: A STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINING A FOUNDATION'S ASSET MIX (1990). Salamon, The

Process, supra note 86, at 119, summarizes several other early simulation results.
201. DEMARCHE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 200.
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asset allocations. 202 Most of these studies estimated real rates of return
that is, profits net of inflation-of between 5% and 6%.23

Simulated data based on market averages don't provide a good picture
of real foundation returns. Other studies have found that some nonprofits
can "dramatically outperform market indices,
and this result should not
be surprising. Foundations have a number of tax and other advantages
over other investors20 5 and may have investment opportunities and revenue
sources other than stocks and bonds.20 6
The more convincing studies look to the actual investment earnings
reported by real foundations on their tax returns. In 1981, the Michigan
Council on Foundations, a trade group that represents foundation interests,
hired the University of Michigan School of Business to examine the
historic investment returns at a handful of Michigan foundations.20 Since
then, the study was turned over to Cambridge Associates LLC ("CAI"), a
financial consultant, which produced updates in 2000, 2004, and 2013.208
Each time, CAI has concluded that "data from ... [t]he actual...

experience of a sample of Michigan foundations [with
diversified
, ,2
portfolios] do[] not support a [payout] rate higher than 5O%. 09
One issue with the CAI study is that it examines not a random sample
of foundations, but instead a group of foundations that apparently
voluntarily agreed to participate. 210 Most of the participating entities,

202. Id.
203. E.g., id. However, an IRS simulation for the years 1979 to 1982 projected a rate of 8.5%, and
that number did not even include unrealized appreciation. MARGARET RILEY, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PRIVATE FOUNDATION INFORMATION RETURNS, 1982, at 7 (1985), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-soi/82pfinforeturns.pdf.
204. Garth Heutel & Richard Zeckhauser, The Investment Returns of Nonprofit Organizations,
PartI: Tales from 990 Forms, 25 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 41, 45 (2014).
205. Taxable investors are more reluctant to shift investments because selling most assets triggers
a tax on any investment gains in that asset. Therefore, we should expect nonprofits to be able to more
actively churn their portfolios. Halperin, supra note 26, at 309. At the same time, because of its long
time horizon, the foundation typically has the luxury of holding relatively illiquid assets, which can
provide for a greater return. See Lester M. Salamon, Foundationsas Investment ManagersPart II: The
Performance, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 239, 244 (1993) [hereinafter Salamon, The
Performance] (reporting that "[f]oundations with longer time horizons tended to perform better").
Foundations have opportunities for tax arbitrage; to take the simplest example, a foundation can hold
taxable bonds, rather than tax-exempt bonds, and earn the higher rate of return that taxable bonds
carry. See John M. R. Chalmers, Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from
Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations, 11 REv. FIN. STUD. 281, 284-88
(1998) (summarizing evidence on the premium for taxable bonds).
206. See infratbl.A.1.
207. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., SUSTAINABLE PAYOUT FOR FOUNDATIONS, at iii (2000).
208. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. LLC, SUSTAINABLE PAYOUT FOR FOUNDATIONS: 2013 UPDATE STUDY
1-2 (2013) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. LLC, UPDATE].
209. Id. at 1.
210. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 207, at 1-2.
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furthermore, were in Michigan. We might expect that a foundation that
agrees to open its books to close scrutiny by outsiders would be atypical in
some ways. For example, if foundations with good or bad results were
more likely to be included in the sample group, that could produce results
that are not representative of the foundation population as a whole. In any
event, given the small size of the study-fewer than 50 firms-its results
may be unrepresentative simply by random chance.
The nonprofit scholar Lester Salamon took a more convincing
approach.212 Salamon drew a random sample of more than 1000
foundation tax returns, sent them a mail survey, and then examined more
closely the 350 or so that responded.2 13 Once more, we don't know
whether the firms that responded were representative of the sector as a
whole, but at least Salamon was looking at about seven times as many
firms. On the other hand, he was only able to study seven years of data,
from 1979 to 1986.214 Over that stretch, Salamon reports that "[a]fter
adjusting for inflation, the rate of return on foundation assets was close to
[eleven] percent a year. ,215
In an attempt to get a truly representative picture of foundation
performance, I replicate the CAI methodology in a large, randomized
sample of private foundations with 25 years of data. Again, I detail the
construction of the sample and my calculations in the Appendix.
I find an average compound return a bit higher than the CAI results.
The mean nominal rate of return is 12.69%. The weighted median is
8.52%. 216 These returns are good but not extraordinary; many simple
investment portfolios could have achieved returns in excess of 11% over
the same period.21
Obviously, this number is much higher than the 5% figure estimated by
CAl. In fact, though, the nominal rates of return I find-that is, the returns

211. See id. at 23. CAI's 2013 update reportedly adds "data from a national aggregate of private
foundations obtained from the IRS," without detailing the methodology for that analysis. CAMBRIDGE
Assocs. LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4. A footnote to the update appears to imply that the report
relied on IRS aggregate data, id. at 4 n.3, suggesting that the report does not winsorize to exclude
extreme outliers.
212. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 241-42.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 243. An IRS study of 1 year of data also found returns of 12.4%. Margaret Riley,
Private Foundation Returns, 1985, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI BULLETIN: SUMMER 1989, at
27, 31 (1989). In a summary table, Yoder and McAllister report mean net investment income,
exclusive of asset appreciation, of 9.9% for the period 1995 through 2007. Yoder & McAllister, supra
note 82, at 53, 58.
216. The unweighted but winsorized mean is 8.11%, with a median of 6.87%.
217. CAMBRIDGE Assocs., INc., supra note 207, at 7.
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before inflation-are quite close to the CAI figures. For example, CAI's
2000 report finds nominal rates of between 11.04% and 12.48%.218 CAI
apparently reaches its much lower figure by discounting nominal returns
by a rate of inflation of between 5% and 6%.219
To provide a full apples-to-apples comparison, I also attempt to
estimate a real (i.e., net of inflation) rate of return. I cannot be certain that
I am fully replicating CAI's method, however, because CAI does not
disclose how they calculated their22inflation
rate, except to state that their
0
figure relies on the "CPI deflator.,
I emphasize the choice of inflation methods because the average
inflation rates in my data are much lower than the 5% to 6% range CAI
assumes in its 2000 report. 221 Depending on which measure of inflation I
employ, I get an average inflation rate of between 2.5% and 3.3%. Readers
interested in inflation measures can find more detail in the Appendix.
After accounting for inflation, firms still achieve an average rate of
return of between 9.34% and 10.11%. The median real compound return is
4.84% to 5.65%. Table 1 summarizes the results.
TABLE 1: REAL RATES OF RETURN AT A SAMPLE OF PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS USING THREE DIFFERENT MEASURES OF INFLATION,

1985 TO 2011

Mean
Median

CPI-U
9.34%
4.84%

PCE
10.05%
5.59%

GDP Deflator
10.11%
5.65%

Notes: Source: IRS PF-SOI 2011 Cumulative File. Number of firms: 21,486. Data are winsorized and
weighted by average firm assets.

In short, I find that even when accounting for inflation, we should
expect that the average dollar invested in a private foundation will earn a
return of at least 9%. That number, of course, is considerably higher than
the current 5% minimum payout required under federal law. The 5%
figure was defended, historically, as the maximum that foundations could

218. Id. at 7, 25. The 2013 update claims that both Michigan and "national" nominal returns are
lower, at about 9.5%. CAMBRIDGE Assocs. LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4. Notably, the data for
the update end in 2009, id., which of course was a historically poor year for investment assets.
219. CAMBRIDGE Assocs., INC., supra note 207, at 7.
220. Id. at 25. I submitted a working draft of this paper to CAI for their comment, but they did not
respond, despite initially indicating that they would do so.
221. The 2013 Update appears to apply an inflation discount of about 3%. CAMBRIDGE Assocs.
LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4.
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222

spend and still be able to sustain their endowment. My results suggest
that sustainable spending could exceed 5% by a considerable margin.
It might be argued that, while the mean rates of return are substantial,
median rates fall around the traditional 5% figure. About half of
foundations, mostly quite small ones, cannot sustainably spend 5%.
I would argue in response that the mean returns are much more
important for policy purposes. For one, we've seen that most of the
arguments for restricted spending apply to the foundation sector as a
whole, not any given firm. The mean rate of return is the number that
would preserve the total amount of funds available across all firms and
time periods. Secondly, even if a minimum payout set at the mean rate
would eventually cause underperforming firms to spend down their assets
(assuming no new contributions), that is the right result. If Congress can
invest public money in two alternate savings vehicles, one paying 5% and
the other 10%, why would it want to leave its funds in the firm that can
only manage a 5% return? To the extent that there is value in perpetual life
for a particular firm, we've seen that this value likely only holds for large
and venerable organizations, not the small and perhaps neglected
foundations that largely comprise the group earning sub-median returns.2 23
In any event, even if there were good policy reasons to protect the
perpetuity of small underperforming foundations, that would not be a
reason to set the same minimum payout rate for larger and more successful
ones. There is no obvious reason Congress must set the same minimum
payout rate for all foundations. Minimum payout rates could be
determined by the amount of foundation assets-for instance, by having
the minimum rate scale up as assets increase-or set individually for each
firm by using a rolling average of past investment performance. 224
2. New Data on Growth in Overall FoundationAssets

As I argued in Part III, standard finance theory suggests that
foundations should be willing to spend out of future expected
contributions as well as present wealth. Therefore, I also examine the
combined effect of investment returns and new contributions on
foundation assets. I follow the same methodology as in Part V.C. 1, except

222. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
223. See Richard Sansing & Robert Yetman, Governing Private Foundations Using the Tax Law,

41 J. AcCT. & ECON. 363, 376 (2006) (describing the positive relationship between firm size and
investment returns); Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 247 (same).
224. On the latter point, see Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 20.
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that the formula for change in assets does not subtract out new
contributions. Table 2 summarizes the results.
TABLE

2:

AVERAGE PRIVATE FOUNDATION INVESTMENT RETURNS PLUS
NEW CONTRIBUTIONS

Mean
Medlianl

Grow\thi Rate Per- Firm.,
Real Dollars
18.17%
8.1 3%l

Nominial Grw,thi Rate PerFirmi Overi Nominal UIS GDP
2.72
1.61

Notes: Reflects period 1985 to 2011. Inflation calculated using historical PCE deflator data from the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Individual firm data are winsorized and weighted by firm mean
assets. Source: IRS PF-SOI cumulative file.

As Table 2 shows, the combination of investments and donations
would allow foundations to grow at more than 18% a year on average. I
also find that foundation assets grow considerably faster than the
economy: The median firm grew more than 60% faster than the US
225
economy.
Because I measure only within-foundation changes, these data might
either over- or understate assets available to the foundation sector as a
whole, as foundations may close or new foundations may open. Survey
data from the Foundation Center report that the number of foundations
grew from 64,000 to 86,000 between 2002 and 2012, and that new gifts to
foundations have been roughly equal to total foundation grants paid in
about half the years over that period.2 26 That is, in half of the years in the
last decade the foundation sector has, on net, not spent any of the

investment return on its assets."

Foundation Center data show that

foundations have usually grown by more than 5% annually, net of
expenditures, implying that there is room for considerably greater
spending. 228

225. I include share of GDP because, as Gene Steuerle argues, "[t]he absolute size of the
foundation sector may not be so important as its size relative to national wealth." Steuerle, supra note
198, at 428. I compare each firm's growth rate to the growth in GDP over the period we have data for
that firm. This explains why the ratio for mean GDP ratio is not more than double the ratio for median
GDP ratio: the GDP growth rate is different for the mean and median firm.
226. Foundation Stats, FOUND. CTR., http://data.foundationcenter.org/about.html#quick-start (last
visited Apr. 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/43C8-867G.
227. See id.
228. Id.; see also PERRY MEHRLING, NAT'L NETWORK OF GRANTMAKERS, SPENDING POLICIES
FOR FOUNDATIONS: THE CASE FOR INCREASED GRANTS PAYOUT 7 (1999), available at
https://economics.barnard.edu/sites/default/files/inline/spending policies.pdf (examining Foundation
Center data for 1980s and 1990s).

1192

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:1143

Figure 2 illustrates foundation inflows and outflows between 1985 and
2011. Notably, there was not a single year during this period when real
total foundation savings declined.
FIGURE 2: AGGREGATE FOUNDATION REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES,

1985-2011

Notes: Values summed across all sampled foundations. Dollar values deflated to 2011 dollars using
the PCE deflator. Source: IRS PF-SO1 2011 Cumulative File. Number of firm-years: 228,407.

3. Summary and Caveats

I believe these data make a strong case that, even assuming foundations
should do nothing but spend an equal amount of money every year in
perpetuity, the amount the law could demand they spend should be much
higher than the present 5%. Admittedly, however, there might be some
offsetting costs to higher spending rates. We do not presently know how
donors would respond to an increased payout requirement. If donors view
payout rates as burdensome, they might shift to giving directly to
operating charities, and it is also possible that overall contributions to
charity could fall. This effect could be offset if managers are concerned
about falling asset balances and work harder to bring in new donations. If
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managers dislike high payout rates or fundraising, however, they might
demand greater compensation. There is some existing evidence that
managers at faster-paying firms earn a bit more, 229 and I find a similar
trend in my data, as detailed in the Appendix. This latter cost is a modest
portion of foundation resources, however.
More problematically, if managers view payouts as in effect a tax, they
might be less willing to exert effort at earning a high return on foundation
assets. There is some evidence that pre-1981 law, which imposed in effect
a 100% payout requirement on foundation earnings above 5%, somewhat
depressed foundation investment performance. 210 But reforms to increase
payouts to something like 10% or 15% would be a much less draconian
burden than 100%, so it is hard to know whether the pre-1981 scenario
would return under my proposals. More empirical work on these questions
would be useful going forward.
D. Section 4940: FederalTax on Net Investment Earnings

In addition to requiring a minimum payout of foundation net assets,
Congress also imposes a small tax on net foundation investment earnings
("NIE").231 Ordinarily, the tax rate is 2%, but an organization can cut that
to 1% if its annual payout share exceeds its average over the previous fiveyear period.232 Given this low rate, and the fact that net earnings are only a
fraction of the value of the foundation's total investments, the total amount
of tax is tiny compared to the payout requirement. In my data, the mean
tax payment is just $35,000,
or about one-tenth of 1% of the average
233
firm's investment assets.
In theory, a tax on foundation investment income could spur increased
grant making. Like a carbon tax, the foundation tax would be a
"Pigouvian" tax, or a penalty on a behavior that has undesirable effects for
others. 234 By reducing the payoff to investing, the tax would make
investing less attractive for managers, relative to other options-in

229. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 365, also find a significant correlation between payout
rates and compensation.
230. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 243-44. Salamon notes that overall market
conditions were also changing during this period, making causation difficult to pin down. Id.
231. J.R.C. § 4940 (2014).
232. For a cogent summary of the intricacies of the tax, see Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at
49.
233. See infratbl.A.1.
234. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 141-42 (describing Pigouvian taxes).
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economics lingo, this is the "substitution effect" of the tax. 5 So managers
would be more inclined to spend, although potentially some of that
spending might be on their own salary and perks rather than grant

awards .236
But taxes also could affect foundations in other ways. Right now,
foundations can aggressively switch between investments without
worrying that sale of the underperforming asset will trigger a tax on the
237
appreciated gains.
Making them taxable would undermine this
advantage. Lower returns on investment could also reduce managers'
incentives to put time and resources into asset management, although it
also could spur fundraising to make up for the lost dollars. And donors,
knowing that their contributions will earn lower returns overall, might give
less.238 So even if the foundations actually pay little in tax, the behavioral
side effects of its imposition could reduce the resources available for
charity. Professor Halperin proposes a tax on total assets, rather than
earnings, which could eliminate the first problem but likely not the
others. 23
More problematic still, an NIE tax could actually diminish managers'
desire to spend. An economist would say that there is an undesirable
"income effect" that contends with the substitution effect we want to
produce. 2 40 For example, suppose that in order to maintain the foundation
in perpetuity and protect their jobs, managers prefer to spend only
investment earnings, and will not spend any money directly out of
endowment. 4 By reducing the net earnings of the foundation, the tax
would reduce the amount these managers would be willing to spend.
On the other hand, a minimum payout rule, in combination with a
higher tax, might soften the blow of the income effect. Perhaps the relative
influence of the income and substitution effects varies across firms. The
worry would be that the drop in spending due to the income effect at some
firms would outweigh the substitution-driven increase at others. A
minimum payout would help to tip the balance towards greater spending,

235. See id. at 36; see Halperin, supra note 30 (proposing this rationale for a tax on investment
income).
236. See Halperin, supra note 26, at 305-06.

237. Id. at 309.
238. See id. at 301. For evidence, see Heutel & Zeckhauser, supra note 204, at 43.
239. Halperin, supra note 30.
240. GRUBER, supra note 60, at 36; see also Halperin, supra note 26, at 305.

241. One suggestive piece of evidence on this front is that foundations' shift to higher-return
investment strategies closely followed the 1981 reduction of mandatory payout rates. Salamon, The
Process, supra note 86, at 128.
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by constraining firms that would otherwise be inclined to cut their
expenditures. But this would certainly not be a perfect solution.
This might be a situation where carrots, not sticks, offer a better
solution. 242 If Congress could offer higher after-tax investment returns to
foundations that pay out more generously, that would flip some of the
unwanted side effects of an investment tax. An investment bonus for
payouts would still create substitution effects in favor of spending, but
would also realign income effects to point in the right direction.243 Since it
would be, in effect, a matching grant for foundation investments, it might
also encourage donors to give more, and managers to work harder.
Current law somewhat approximates this goal, but clumsily. Again, by
exceeding their 5-year historical average payout, foundations can trim
their tax from 2% to 1%.244 One problem with this approach is that, as
others note, it sometimes gives firms the wrong incentive, since increased
payouts in any year will require even higher payouts in the future in order
to secure the 1% rate. 245 My colleague Ray Madoff has recently proposed
a simplified version that eliminates this problem. 4 6 More generally,
though, it is unclear that a 1% carrot is enough of an incentive: the right
bonus could be 5% or 10%.247
All of this is to say that the optimal rate of tax on foundation
investments depends on a set of tradeoffs. Since we don't yet have good
data on how firms would respond to a significant tax, the correct rate is
unclear, and might well be negative-that is, the best policy might be a
subsidy, not a tax at all.
What we do know is that foundations with living donors behave quite
differently than firms whose founders are long gone: foundations with
deceased donors are much more likely to distribute only the statutory
minimum. 24' Potentially, the ideal policy would impose different rates of
tax, or offer different rates of subsidy, depending on these kinds of basic
firm demographics. For instance, for "old and cold" foundations that are

242. For a more complete discussion of the carrot/stick tradeoff, see Brian Galle, The Tragedy of
the Carrots:Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REv. 797, 83140 (2012).

243. Id. at 832.
244. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
245. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 367; Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 46-47.
246. Ray D. Madoff, A Better Way to Encourage Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/a-better-way-to-encourage-charity.html?
r=0.
247. The 1% cut is a carrot because it enriches firms relative to the existing 2% baseline. Galle,
supra note 242, at 803-04.
248. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 248-50; Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223,
at 365; Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 47; see also supra fig. 1.
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unable to attract new donations, and whose spending has been persistently
bumping along at the statutory minimum, a tax might make more sense
than a subsidy. The minimum distribution rule already is preventing
untoward income effects, and bonuses may be unlikely to spur new giving.
E. CountercyclicalPayouts
In Part IV.B, I argued that restricted spending can be justified to the
extent that foundations play a role in fighting recessions and disasters. We
saw empirically that does not actually happen. One likely reason, as others
have observed, is that current tax law actually discourages recessionfighting, or "countercyclical," foundation spending. 249 Because the
minimum payout rule depends on the value of the foundation's assets in
the prior tax year, and assets tend to decline in value during economic
slowdowns, existing law weakens any incentive for firms to spend during
hard times. Managers' job security concerns may be especially acute
during recessions, compounding the problem. As we saw earlier, a similar
tax flaw is that the incentives for new contributions to philanthropic
organizations also decline during recessions, due to the diminishing worth
of the charitable contribution deduction during those periods.250
Prior proposals to fix these problems are too milquetoast. The main
suggestion, which is sensible, is to calculate the minimum payout floor
based on a multi-year, rolling average of the firm's assets, instead of just
one year at a time." That way, at the beginning of recessions, the average
will include some good years as well as the more recent bad ones 2 But
this idea just doesn't go far enough. Using my sample of foundations, I ran
simulations in which I calculated how much a 3-year inflation-adjusted
rolling average would boost spending during recession years. 253 The 3year average raised recession spending by about 11.3%, from a mean of
$7.6 million to a mean of $8.5 million. Inflation adjustment is important;
without it, spending increases only 5.5%.
In any event, rolling averages would also have the unwanted side effect
of depressing spending in the period just after recessions, since the postrecession average would be weighed down by the recessionary asset

249. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 112, at 2.
250. Steuerle, supra note 198, at 425.
251. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 251; Steuerle, supra note 198, at 426.
252. Salamon, The Performance,supra note 205, at 251; Steuerle, supra note 198, at 426.
253. For simplicity, I assume that all firms actually meet or exceed their minimum-spending
threshold.

2016]

PAY IT FORWARD?

1197

values. State and local budgets usually lag recessions somewhat. 4 The
period of greatest fiscal stress for those governments-and therefore the
time of greatest need for charitable supplements-would be just when
rolling averages would be pushing down foundation spending.
It would be more effective, and more consistent with the best rationales
for restricted spending, to raise the minimum spending floor during
recessions. For example, a simulation of a temporary 2% increase in the
payout floor, to 7% during recessions, predicts a 26% increase in recession
spending. 255
To be sure, we should consider carrots for countercyclical spending
alongside, or instead of, the minimum payout stick. For instance, to make
up for shortfalls in donations, Congress and state governments could offer
more generous tax subsidies during times of need, as Congress has
occasionally done before.256
A more dramatic approach would be to add a bonus deduction, perhaps
even refundable, for donations that are earmarked for immediate spending
during recessions. That would accomplish several recession-fighting goals
at once: it would lower taxes, put more people to work, and provide more
safety-net spending. It is possible that the bonus would only change the
timing of some planned gifts, rather than increasing donations overall.25
That, though, would also be socially useful, since the payoff to the
government's subsidy dollar is higher during recessions.
A parallel policy aimed at foundation managers could be to offer bonus
credit against future § 4942 requirements or § 4940 liability. That is, if a
foundation spends a dollar above the 5% floor during a recession, it would
be able to reduce the amount it must distribute after the recession ends by,
say, $1.20 or $1.50. Again, the effect of this incentive would mostly be to
shift the timing of foundation spending, 258 but that is exactly what
governments should do: they should move public money from flush times
to hard times. My own view is that this option is hard to defend, since it
would tend to reduce foundation spending rates overall. I offer it for those
who disagree with me about the value of restricted spending, but would
nonetheless like to see foundations act more countercyclically.

254. Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 161, at 57.
255. To simplify, I assume the simulated policy would not affect the foundation's assets except
through the spending rule.
256. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
257. See Bakija, supra note 123, at 573 (suggesting that some donor response to variations in tax
incentives may be pure re-timing).
258. If donors view spending floors as a tax, there might also be increased donations via the
income effect.
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Finally, foundations could be encouraged to issue more loans or loan
guarantees. Service organizations report that donations and local
government contracts dry up during recessions.25 9 As we saw earlier, a
firm without credit constraints would borrow to smooth revenues over
these tougher periods, especially given the higher marginal returns to its
output-that is, the greater social need-during those times. Foundations
could step in to help service organizations fill this borrowing need.
Current law already offers very mild incentives in this direction,
allowing foundations to count below-market loans to service providers
against their § 4942 limit. 260 In my sample, though, foundations hardly use
this option at all; barely one-tenth of 1%
of foundation assets is given over
' 261
to these "program-related investments.,
More generous treatment-such as offering bonuses against later
§ 4942 obligations, allowing foundations to earn higher rates of return, or
booking loan guarantees as current expenditures-might help to stimulate
more loans. Even a simple informational campaign could help foundations
to recognize the important role that more aggressive use of loans and
guarantees could serve.
All of these policies would work better if they were automatically
triggered. Timing is crucial for recession-fighting policy. 262 Waiting for
Congress to get around to enacting a temporary fix rarely works out
well, 263 as our experiences with the 2009 stimulus bill illustrated. A welldesigned statute would trigger whenever economic conditions hit certain
thresholds, such as employment rates that dipped a substantial amount
below historical trends.264
F. Closing Donor-Advised-FundLoopholes

I mentioned earlier that the last decade has seen a dramatic rise of
donor-advised funds, an alternative to private foundations. Because of
their novelty, DAFs remain exempt from many of the rules that govern

259. See generally, e.g., Noah D. Drezner, Recessions and Tax Cuts: Economic Cycles' Impact on
Individual Giving, Philanthropy,and HigherEducation, 6 INT'L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 289 (2006).
260. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2014); see also David A. Levitt & Robert A. Wexler, ProposedRegulations
Would Bring Program-RelatedInvestments into the 21st Century, J. TAX'N, Aug. 2012, at 100, 102-

03.
261. See infratbl.A.1.
262. See Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. REV.
171, 179-81 (2003).
263. Christina D. Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 23, 37 (1999).
264. See Strnad, supra note 262, at 179-81.
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private foundations-and indeed, DAF organizers attribute much of the
institution's popularity to this freedom.265 In the long run, it will do little
good to reform the rules of private foundation spending if new donors can
use DAFs to avoid the new rules.
Most critically, DAFs are not subject to any minimum payout
requirement. 266 Contributors to a qualified DAF can claim a full charitable
contribution deduction at the date of transfer, even if the fund itself never
distributes any money. 267 Furthermore, because the organizations that
sponsor DAFs are usually treated as public charities for tax purposes,
donors get an even more generous tax subsidy than is usually available to
private foundation contributors. 261
DAF defenders suggest that no minimum payout rule is needed,
because they claim that as a descriptive matter, payouts from DAFs have
been relatively rapid. 269 This is not necessarily true, and also proves less
than the defenders think. The IRS does not currently require DAF
sponsors to report DAF payouts on a fund-by-fund basis. 270 Therefore,
sponsors such as Fidelity are able to report aggregate statistics. Judging by
these aggregates, DAF payout rates are respectable, averaging about 16%
of the funds under management annually. 2 1 But we have no way of
knowing whether this could represent a few funds that pay out all their
money, together with many funds that pay little or nothing. 272 Recent IRS
data suggest that roughly a quarter of DAF sponsor organizations average
close to a 0% payout. 27' Further, because DAFs are so new, we don't
know what DAF payout rates will look like when the funds are mature,
especially after the death of the donor. In the private foundation data, old
firms, especially those whose original donors have passed on, spend much
lower shares of their assets than others. 2 4
It might also be argued that DAFs raise fewer concerns about agency
costs than foundations. In theory, all the spending decisions of the DAF

265. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 147.
266. Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to Distribute
2
Income Generally Apply to "'PrivateFoundation Substitutes" Evaluating the Taxation of Various
Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 493, 509 (2010).
267. See id.
268. Marsh, supra note 17, at 147.
269. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND

DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 73-74 (2011) (summarizing advocate comments).
270. Id. at 5, 50.
271.

NAT'L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST,2013 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 7 (2013).

272. U.S. DEP'T OFTHE TREASURY, supra note 269, at 59.
273. Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS Data, 1 B.C. L. SCH. F. ON
PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 61, 67 (2015).
274. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 378-79; see also supra fig. 1.

1200

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1143

are made by the contributors, mitigating the problem that managers will
make decisions the donors wouldn't. The DAF agency problem is subtler,
though. DAF sponsors make money by claiming a yearly management fee,
usually a percentage point or two of the assets in the fund.2 The sponsors
therefore have an incentive to discourage distributions. DAF sponsors
have been wonderfully innovative in crafting ways to make it easy to get
money into a DAF, but we haven't seen similar innovations in tools for
spending the money. 2 6 Neither of these facts is surprising, given the way
that DAF sponsors are compensated.
G. State Law

Finally, the federal government is not the only charity regulator. State
organizational law provides default rules for the rights and obligations that
nonprofit stakeholders share. Notably, state law provides background
principles for how nonprofit managers invest and spend the organization's
funds.2 In 2006 and the years following, many states undertook dramatic
revision to their investment rules, as they adopted a model act known as
the Uniform
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, or
2
"UPMIFA." 78
A little-noticed provision of UPMIFA could have considerable impact
on foundation spending. UPMIFA's drafters included an optional
provision (modeled on a longstanding Massachusetts rule) allowing
adopting states to create a soft cap on endowment spending for corporate
charities (but not, for the most part, charitable trusts). 279 The cap states that
annual spending in excess of 7% of a firm's investment assets would be
presumptively a violation of the manager's duty to the organization,
although the presumption is rebuttable. 280 Fifteen states have adopted
some version of the cap, although Ohio's differs from all the others.281

275. Marsh, supra note 17, at 147, 178.
276. See id. at 175-76 (describing bare-bones donation forms employed by DAFs); U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, supra note 269, at 50 (noting evidence of low advisory effort by national DAF
sponsors).
277. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 47, at 304-06.
278. Gary, supra note 25, at 1288-89.
279.

See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4(d) (2006).

280. Id.
281. CAL. PROB. CODE § 18504(d) (West 2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 5104(7) (2015); MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-403(d) (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180A, § 2 (2015);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-30-209(4) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.667(4) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 292-B:4(VI) (2015); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 553(d) (McKinney 2015); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 59-21-03(4) (2015); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.53(D) (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT.
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My empirical analysis shows that the cap has had an impact on
foundation spending. Table 3 reports the results of a regression analysis
comparing firms in UPMIFA-adopting states before and after the adoption
of the spending cap. I first examine the effect of changes in law within
firms over time, comparing firms where the cap took effect against other
firms in the same state that are not governed by UPMIFA-a so-called
"difference in differences" analysis. The imposition of a cap seems to
reduce average spending in newly capped firms by about 8% and reduces
the likelihood that the firm will exceed the federal floor by 7%. In another
analysis, detailed in the Appendix, I also find that, comparing firms
subject to a cap to similar firms in uncapped states, capped firms are 30%
less likely to exceed the 5% federal spending floor.
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF DEFAULT SPENDING CAP ON FOUNDATION
EXPENDITURES

VARIABLES

Year subject to cap
Log officer comp.
R-squared

(1)
Does Firm Pay Over Five
Percent Floor?

(2)
Log of Grants
Awarded

-0.071O***
(-4.971)
0.061
(3.348)
0.096

-0.083W::*
(-5.938)
0.0949:..
(3.356)
0.037

Notes: Coefficients reported with (z-score). Regressions include controls for foundation net assets,
donations received, officer compensation, income, and negative income; state expenditures,
population, and share of population under 26 and over 64; and state, firm, and calendar-year fixed
effects. Number of firms: 7,477. ***: statistically significant at the 1% level.

There is no obvious policy justification for the spending cap, and it is
reducing the money available for current charitable needs.282 The policy
recommendation here is simple. States should repeal their caps. Further,
some states have adopted tax incentives to lure restricted-spending

§ 128.322(4) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-10-204(d) (2015); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 163.005(d)

(West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 51-8-304 (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-7-304(d) (2015).
Ohio sets the cap at 5% and flips the presumption, stating that spending under 5% is
presumptively prudent. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.53(D).
282. UPMIFA's drafters included the cap provision out of "[c]oncern that charities would be
tempted to spend endowment assets too rapidly." Gary, supra note 25, at 1314.
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vehicles away from other states.
Others should resist this kind of
destructive race to the bottom, and federal rules disfavoring restricted
spending might help in that direction.
CONCLUSION

Choosing exactly the right regulations for restricted-spending charities
won't necessarily be easy or obvious, but we probably know enough today
to take some first steps. The arguments in favor of subsidizing charitable
gifts subject to restricted spending are surprisingly thin. Future
philanthropy is often predictably of lower value than charity today. To the
extent that waiting has value, that goal can be met through policies other
than perpetually restricted spending: Organizations can raise new money,
and government policy can encourage organizations to set aside money
temporarily to distribute in a later crisis.
The real question, then, is how best to reconcile the unappealing nature
of restricted spending with the welter of current laws that support and
encourage it. To be sure, any policy change could have unwanted side
effects. If we demand that donors allow their gifts to be spent more
quickly, there is some potential that donors or managers could change
their behaviors in response. But there is no evidence right now to suggest
that this effect would be a major factor. There is, on the other hand,
considerable evidence-including new data I have reported here-that
foundations could continue indefinitely even under much higher rates of
spending than the law now requires. Further, there seem to be no worries
about side effects from revoking several of the more egregious, and
unjustified, rules propping up restricted spending, such as the nonregulation of donor-advised funds and state laws that seem to have no
purpose other than a race to the bottom to entice foundation-lawyering
business from state to state.
In sum, while caution is appropriate, this is an area where some of the
fruit are hanging low indeed. Policy makers should consider some first
steps now, and researchers can study whether these steps give any
indication that more dramatic action to curb restricted spending would
have unwanted impacts.

283. Irvin, supra note 10, at 454.
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APPENDIX

The foundation data used throughout this Article are derived from the
2011 Cumulative PF-SOI data file compiled by the National Center on
Charitable Statistics ("NCCS"). NCCS collates data from individual Form
990 tax returns filed by each foundation and then machine-scanned by the
IRS. The Cumulative file includes tax returns for fiscal years spanning
1985 through 2011. Not all organizations are included in the PF-SOI data;
instead, the data are a stratified sample, with overweighting of the largest
firms. Unless otherwise noted, I use sample weighting to recover the
population distribution.
Except where noted, I deflate nominal values to real dollar amounts
using the PCE index calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table A. 1 provides a statistical overview of the data; data reported in this
table are not winsorized but are sample weighted.
TABLE

A. 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable
Donations

Mean
38 6773

SD
1.6F6E07

Min
0

Max
1.40E+)F

Fundraising

498220.9

9426910

0

3.77E+09

Assets

6 170387

1.3 IE+08

0i

3F+10

Taxable Trust?

0.00345

0.018572

01

Operating Foundation?

0

0)2721 1

§ 4942 Expends

477772.4

9200223

0

3.77E+09

Other Income

33831.49

127 1622

-3.F54+08

4.14E+ 08-,'

Total Income

848706.7

2.1OE+07

-4.63E+08

1.39E+10

Officer Comp.

1085059

81551.72

Grants Paid

415127.2

1.05E+07

0

All Expends

534889.7

1.17E+07

04.72E+09

Liabilities

233251.6

1.49E+07

0

Payout /Inv. Assets

1575511

69. 1.112

Net Investment Assets

5532168

1.22E+08

0

UPMEFA in Effect

0169227

037499 3

0I

Prog. Related Inv. ($)

34342

821275

0

2080
IS

1

9371595
4.16E+09

1.29E+10
18773.4
3.55E+10

1.68E+08

Notes: Number of Observations: 228,407. All dollar figures deflated to 2009 dollars using the PCE
deflator.
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FoundationReturns on Investment
Part V.C.1 describes the historical rate of return on foundation
investments. For the most part, I replicate the methodology of Cambridge
Associates, Inc. ("CAI"), which has prepared a series of prior reports, but I
use my full sample of thousands of foundations, rather than CAI's four
dozen. I omit private operating foundations and nonexempt charitable
trusts.
To calculate the average compounded rate of return, I follow the
method for imputing investment returns provided in the 2000 CAI report
Appendix D. That is, the imputed annual rate of return, before inflation, is:
(net investment assets, - net investment assets, 1 + expenditures, +
taxes paid, - new contributions,) / net investment assets,
where the subscripts t and t-] indicate that values are for the current fiscal
year and the antecedent year, respectively.2 84 In order to translate these
figures into a compounded rate of return, I link the individual annual
observations in a geometric sequence and compute an annual rate of return
using the standard compound growth rate formula.
As typically occurs with large financial databases, the resulting values
include some extreme outliers. A standard research practice in this context
is to "winsorize" the data, which is to drop observations falling in the
highest and lowest percentile of results.285 Hand examination of samples of
the dropped observations suggests that many seem to have been carelessly
reported or inaccurately scanned, with implausible values for key inputs
286
into the formula. Again, following the methodology of the CAI report, I
also weight the results by firm assets.
I calculate real rates of return using three measures of inflation. The US
government uses different measures of inflation for different purposes.

284. The CAI study is unclear on whether it uses current- or antecedent-year-values for
expenditures, taxes, and new contributions. Logically, since the value we are reconstructing is the
change in asset values between the end of year 0 and the end of year 1, these should be year 1 values.
Both expenditures and taxes paid are included in the equation because the instructions for the

"total expenditures" field on the Form 990 direct the firm to exclude the amount of taxes paid when
calculating the "total."
285. Dhiren Ghosh & Andrew Vogt, Outliers: An Evaluation of Methodologies,

1 AM.

STATISTICAL ASS'N SECTION ON SURVEY METHODS-JOINT STATISTICAL MEETING 2012, at 3455,

3456 (2012).
286. For example, NCCS attempts to flag and correct returns for which some values are reported
in dollars and others in thousands of dollars, but they do not claim, and likely could not realistically
achieve, complete success in that effort.
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Three of the major measures are CPI, PCE, and the GDP deflator.28 Each
measure varies somewhat from the others in which goods are included in
the "basket" whose price is observed, the method of estimating consumer
responses, and similar technical details.288 CPI itself has two variants,
standard and "chained" CPI. 289 Chained CPI and PCE each assume that, as
prices rise, consumers will switch to cheaper alternatives, while standard
CPI assumes (probably unrealistically) a fixed basket of goods.290 PCE is
probably the best measure of the inflation rate facing foundations, since it
is chained and its basket explicitly is modeled to include items commonly
purchased by service-providing nonprofits, while CPI tracks only goods
bought by consumers.29 1
In any event, I calculate real rates of return separately for CPI, PCE,
and GDP deflator. I allow each firm to face an individualized inflation rate
by comparing monthly inflation rates for the last month of the firm's fiscal
year in the first year the firm appears in the SOI file against the monthly
CPI-U for the last month the firm appears.292
Recessionary Spending Simulation
Part V.D reports the simulated effect on recessionary spending of a
policy in which firms use an inflation-adjusted 3-year average of their
minimum payout floor. Recession dates are derived from NBER
determinations. 299 I code a year as recessionary if the economy was
contracting for more than one month of that year.294 To run the simulation,
I assume that any firm that met its minimum payout rate in reality would
also meet any increased payout triggered by the use of a 3-year average;

287. Clinton P. McCully et al., Comparing the Consumer Price Index and the Personal
Consumption Expenditures Price Index, SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Nov. 2007, at 26, 26; What Is an
Implicit Price Deflator and Where Can I Find the GNP IPD?, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS,
http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfmfaq id=513 (last updated Mar. 19, 2009), archived at
https://perma.cc/3CWH-JNFC.
288. See McCully et al., supra note 287, at 28-30.
289. Sean Sullivan, The Ins and Outs of 'Chained CPI' Explained, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/10/the-ins-and-outs-of-chained-cpi-explain
ed].

290. See McCully et al., supra note 287, at 28.
291. See id. at 29.
292. Because historical GDP deflator data are only available quarterly, I use the quarter closest to

the close of the firm's fiscal year in place of the actual month.
293.

US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.,

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/85F2M7MB.
294. I therefore code 2007 as non-recessionary, since the economy was contracting only in
December of that year.
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this assumption may slightly overstate the real impact of a higher floor.
For simplicity, I assume that changing the floor does not affect firms
whose spending exceeded the simulated floor amount or those that missed
their real minimum.
After winsorizing and weighting by firm mean assets, I find that mean
spending during recessions was $7.63 million, while simulated spending
using the 3-year average would rise to $8.49 million, an increase of
11.3%. If averaging is done with nominal rather than inflation-adjusted
floor amounts, spending would increase only 5.5%. In contrast, a
simulation of a 7% floor increases mean recession spending to $9.62
million, a 26.1% increase.
Effect of Default Spending Caps

Part V.G describes the results of regression analyses in which I
examine the impact of a state law default presumption of imprudence for
firms spending in excess of 7% of their net investment assets. To control
for the effects of other reforms that might affect spending, I limit the
analysis to states that enact UPMIFA, a 2006 model act adopted by fortysix states between 2006 and 2011. UPMIFA includes an optional provision
imposing the 7% cap, and thirteen states either adopt the model provision
or already had one in place as of the date UPMIFA went into effect. Data
on UPMIFA adoption date and cap adoption were hand collected and
coded. Because Ohio's cap rule is dissimilar from all other states, I omit
Ohio from the analysis. My results aren't meaningfully affected by
dropping Ohio.
I estimate the impact of the cap three different ways. The first two
employ fixed-effects panel regressions, with the dependent variable either
logged grants awarded or the share of firms distributing qualifying funds
in excess of their federal 5% floor. In both cases, I use a difference-indifferences identification strategy. UPMIFA governs the behavior of
nonprofits organized as corporations, but not those organized as trusts.
The reported coefficient measures the interaction effect of dummy
variables for corporate status and post-cap-enactment time period, as in
equation 2, below:
Sit = a + flCapjt +

/W2Corp 1 +

SCapj t

*Corpi+ fl 3Xit + +t

Y'

+

yj

+ sit (2)

where delta is the coefficient of interest, the interaction term between cap
enactment and the "treated" population; j and i index states and firms,
respectively; and X is a vector of firm-level controls. To account for
endogenous choice of form, the Corp variable is defined as the firm's

2016]

PAY IT FORWARD?

1207

organizational form in the year prior to treatment. Since by construction
Corp does not vary within firm, it is dropped in the actual regression.
Because the treatment effect varies only at the state level, I cluster
standard errors by state.
To capture some sense of the cross-sectional variation, the third
approach uses a pooled probit model, again identifying off the difference
in differences. I then estimate the marginal effect of the cap provision at
sample means using the margins command in Stata 13. As reported in the
main text, using this approach suggests that the existence of a cap reduces
by about 28% the likelihood that the mean firm will exceed the federal
spending floor, with 95% confidence interval, from 24.18% to 32.34%. I
note, though, that pooled regressions of this kind can sometimes be biased
upwards.
Complete regression results are available from the author on request. I
also find the expected coefficients on the control variables, as well as that
increased spending is correlated with greater executive compensation. One
dollar in additional grants is correlated with about ten cents in added
executive salary.

